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ABSTRACT 
 Acts of atrocity are an unfortunate, yet recurring theme of warfare.   Committed by 
both professional and unprofessional militaries alike, these acts flagrantly violate 
common standards of competence, morality, ethics, and military professionalism.    
Commonly, these incidents result in the death of innocent civilians or fellow military 
members; involve cover-ups which are later exposed; and lead to attempts by senior 
leadership to deflect the blame elsewhere.  These incidents are serious matters, capturing 
public attention because they are representative of abuses of power or unauthorized uses 
of force.  
 Examination of the My Lai massacre and Abu Ghraib prison scandal offers an 
excellent opportunity to better understand how these incidents affect public opinion.  
Although results for the My Lai incident were inconclusive, it appears the Abu Ghraib 
affected public opinion support for the Iraq War, at least in the short-term.  If presidents 
and military leaders can understand and predict the shift of public opinion support 
following an act of atrocity, they may be able to take decisive action to mitigate potential 
negative effects.    
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. PURPOSE  
 This thesis will examine acts of atrocity in times of war or conflict to determine 
their effect(s) on public opinion support.  For the purposes of this study, acts of atrocity 
are defined as illegal, immoral, or unethical acts, offenses, or mistakes, punishable under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  To qualify as an act of atrocity, these acts or 
offenses must extraordinarily and flagrantly violate acceptable standards of competence, 
morality, ethics, or military professionalism.  Acts of atrocity are serious matters, 
capturing public attention because they are representative of an abuse of power or 
unauthorized use of force by America’s most respected institution.1  These acts violate 
the very foundations of freedom and democracy, create a moral crisis, and cast a negative 
shadow on the legitimacy and reputation of the United States.  Commonly, these 
incidents result in the death of innocent civilians or fellow military members; involve 
cover-ups that are later exposed; and lead to attempts by senior leadership to deflect the 
blame elsewhere.  Examples of acts of atrocity include the My Lai massacre, the Pat 
Tillman friendly fire incident, and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.  The objective of this 
thesis is to identify the relationship between acts of atrocity and their effect(s) if any on 
public opinion support for a war or conflict.   
 The overall question this thesis seeks to answer is: Do acts of atrocity cause a 
negative effect on public support for the war or conflict?  A subset of related questions 
includes:  
• Do these acts of atrocity effectively “finish off” public opinion about a war or 
conflict, or are they merely “bumps and wiggles” in the public support 
timeline? 
• Can we predict the extremity of the shift in public opinion support following 
one of these incidents? 
                                                 
1 According to a Jun 1-4, 2006, Gallup Poll on confidence in institutions.  See 
http://www.galluppoll.com/content/default.aspx?ci=1597 (accessed 24 May 2007).   
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• Are certain types of military misconduct more prone to cause a negative effect 
on public support?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
 The effect of acts of atrocity during times of war or conflict has applications for 
presidents as well as military leaders.  A lack of public opinion support can be a powerful 
constraint to a president’s foreign policy agenda, especially during times of war or 
conflict.2  Similarly, military officers have a responsibility to understand the effects of 
acts of atrocity on public opinion support, because they are responsible for the execution 
of war or conflict in support of the country’s foreign policy initiatives.  Acts of atrocity 
perpetrated by the military may undermine the country’s ability to accomplish its foreign 
policy objectives.  This is especially important when fighting an unpopular war, when 
public opinion support is already fragile.  If presidents can understand and predict the 
extremity of a possible public opinion shift from acts of atrocity, they may be able to take 
decisive action to mitigate potential negative effects.  Likewise, military commanders 
should have a good understanding of these effects and should take every possible step to 
prevent such acts from occurring or reoccurring in their theaters of operations.  If an 
incident does occur, they should take swift and appropriate action to mitigate damage to 
public opinion support for the military operation.     
C.  PUBLIC OPINION IN CONTEXT  
Over three thousand American casualties3 and over four years of conflict have 
had a significant influence on public support for the war in Iraq.  The media response to 
the climbing casualty rate, the November 2006 mid-term election results, and recent elite 
political rhetoric demanding withdrawal are important indicators that public support for 
this conflict has deteriorated.  Favorable public opinion is an essential element to any 
administration’s ability to prosecute war.  This is because public opinion can constrain an 
                                                 
2 Alexander L. George, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need 
for Policy Legitimacy,” in Changes in the International System, Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and 
Alexander L. George, eds, (Boulder: The Westview Press, 1980): 233-235.   
3 “Forces: U.S. & Coalition Casualties,” http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/ 
(accessed February 15, 2007). 
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administration’s ability to carry out its foreign policy goals, especially if the boundaries 
of what is acceptable to the public are breached.   If the war drags on, casualties are 
sustained, the principal foreign policy objectives are considered illegitimate or the public 
perceives that the policy is not being successful, it may “push back” against or punish an 
administration by voting against it in the next election.  A good example of this is the 
public’s response to the Bush administration’s Iraq policy in the November 2006 
election.   In fact, “public opinion, the support and mobilization of which is required for 
sustaining an extended conflict, plays a critical role in resolution, especially when 
government preferences diverge from majority opinion.”4  So important is public opinion 
that it may be America’s Achilles Heel.5  As Robert Cassidy observed with respect to the 
Vietnam War: 
Even though the United States dropped more than 7 million tons of bombs 
on Indochina—more than 300 times the impact of the atomic bombs that 
fell on Japan—North Vietnam’s will was resolute, but the United States’ 
will wavered.  Lacking the military means to destroy the United States’ 
ability to wage war, Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap correctly 
focused on U.S. domestic political resolve to continue to support the war.6   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The importance of public opinion support has been widely recognized and studied 
extensively by political scientists since the Vietnam War.  These studies have yielded 
important conclusions about public opinion in times of war and conflict.  Of particular 
relevance is the scholarly research on the effects of “rallies”; time or war-weariness; 
casualties; and perceptions of success or failure.  From this research we can conclude that 
the American public is actually “pretty prudent”7 with regard to its support for war or 
                                                 
4 Ben D. Mor, “Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: The Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution,” 
Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 2, (1997): 197. 
5 Ellen K. Haddock, “On Words: Clauswitz, Bin Laden, and Public Support,” National War College 
(U.S.), (01-01-2002) and Ollen R. Richey, “Public Support for the War on Terrorism: America’s Achilles 
Heel,” National War College (U.S.), (01-01-2002).   
6 Robert M. Cassidy, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,” Military Review, (September-
October 2000): 48.   
7 Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of 
Military Force, International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1, (March 1992): 49-73 and Bruce W. Jentleson and 
Rebecca L. Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military 
Force,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4, (August 1998) 395-417. 
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conflict.  While many of these studies are essential to our understanding public opinion 
during wartime or conflict, none so far have addressed the question of how acts of 
atrocity affect public opinion support.   
E. RALLY ‘ROUND THE FLAG EFFECT  
John Mueller’s Vietnam-era work on presidential popularity laid the groundwork 
for most modern theories seeking to offer explanations for public support of foreign 
policy.8  Consideration of Mueller’s “rally ‘round the flag variable”9 is important to any 
analysis of public opinion.  According to Baker and O’Neil: 
[Rallies occur] In times of an international event or crisis, when the 
American public sets aside its disagreements with the president’s policies 
or performance in office to present a united front to the international 
community.10   
Similarly, Mueller concluded that for an event to qualify as a rally, the event: 
Must be international; directly involve the United States and the president; 
and be specific, dramatic, and sharply focused in order to ensure the 
public’s attention.  This excludes events that transpire gradually…because 
their impact on public attitudes [are] likely to be diffused.11   
Therefore, according to Mueller’s definition, initiation of war or conflict qualifies as a 
potential rally point.  An extensive review of the literature on rallies reveals that rallies do 
exist; are correlated with public approval; and will result in an adjustment of support for 
                                                 
8 John E. Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” American Political Science 
Review 64, no.1, (March, 1970): 18-34;  John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1973): 1-300; William D. Baker and John R. O’Neal, “Patriotism or Opinion 
Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the “Rally ‘Round the Flag’ Effect,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 45, no. 5, (October 2001): 664; Scott S. Gartner, Gary M. Segura, and Michael Wilkening, “All 
Politics Are Local: Local Losses and Individual Attitudes Towards the Vietnam War,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 41, no. 5, (October 1997): 690. 
9 Muller, “Presidential Popularity,” 21. 
10 Baker and O’Neal, “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership,” 664. 
11 Mueller, “Presidential Popularity,” 21. 
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the president.12   However, rallies are not a long-term phenomenon.  They usually last 
only two to three months.  Nor are they responsible for large increases in presidential 
approval ratings, on average boosting presidential approval by only 3.5 percentage 
points.13  Furthermore, rallies may or may not appear depending on the level of media 
priming and whether political elites support or criticize the administration’s crisis 
response.14  The rally literature reveals that specific incidents, perceived favorably by the 
public, do matter because they create “positive rallies” that are powerful enough to boost 
presidential popularity.  Although it would be logical to assume the converse is also true, 
not much is known about the effect of “negative rallies” or specific incidents perceived 
unfavorably by the public, which is the focus of this thesis study.  Nevertheless, rallies 
are important because they do provide a short-term boost in public approval support for 
                                                 
12 Kernell, “Explaining Presidential Popularity,” 506-522; Baker and O’Neal, “Patriotism or Opinion 
Leadership,” 661-687; Jon Hurwitz, Mark Peffley, and Paul Raymond, “Presidential Support During the 
Iran-Contra Affair,” American Politics Quarterly 17, no. 4, (October 1989): 359-385; Tom W. Smith, 
Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Marianna Toce, “America Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to 
the September 11th Terrorist Attacks,” National Organization for Research: The University of Chicago, 
(October 25, 2001): 1-21.   
13 Kernell, “Explaining Presidential Popularity,” 513; Richard A. Brody and Catherine R. Shapiro, 
“Policy Failure and Public Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President Reagan,” 
Political Behavior 11, no. 4, (December 1989): 360.  
14 Jon A. Krosnick and Donald R. Kinder, “Altering the Foundations of Support for the President 
Through Priming,” The American Political Science Review 84, no. 2, (June 1990); Philip J. Powlick and 
Andrew Z. Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” Mershon International 
Studies Review 42, no. 1, (May 1998): 29; Warren P. Strobel, “The CNN Effect: Myth or Reality?” as cited 
in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, Eugene R. Wittkopf and 
James M. McCormick, eds., (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 
1999): 85-93; Baker and O’Neal, “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership,”; Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. 
Shapiro, and Glenn R. Dempsey, “What Moves Public Opinion,” The American Political Science Review 
81, no. 1, (March 1987); Louis J. Klarevas, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler, “Correspondence: 
Casualties, Polls, and the Iraq War,” International Security 31, no. 2, (Fall 2006); Thomas Knecht and M. 
Stephen Weatherford, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making,” 
International Studies Quarterly 50, (2006); James Meernik and Chelsea Brown, “The Short Path and the 
Long Road: Explaining the Duration of U.S. Military Operations,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1, 
(2007); Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “The Rise of Presidential Polling: The Nixon White 
House in Historical Perspective,” Public Opinion Quarterly 59, no. 2, (Summer 1995); Lawrence R. Jacobs 
and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Presidential Manipulation of Polls and Public Opinion: The Nixon Administration 
and the Pollsters,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4, (Winter, 1995-1996); Shmuel T. Lock, Robert W. 
Shapiro, and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “The Impact of Political Debate on Government Trust: Reminding the 
Public What the Federal Government Does,” Political Behavior 21, no. 3, (September 1999); Erik P. Bucy, 
“Audience Responses to Traumatic News: Processing the World Trade Center Attacks,” Harvard 
Symposium: Restless Searchlight: The Media and Terrorism, (Harvard University: 2002); Michael Koch 
and Scott Sigmund Gartner, “Casualties and Constituencies: Democratic Accountability, Electoral 
Institutions, and Costly Conflicts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6, December 2005); William 
M. Darley, “War Policy, Public Support, and the Media,” Parameters 35, no. 2, (Summer 2005). 
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the president.  (For the rally variable, support for the president is the dependent variable.)  
However, support for the president, does not necessarily constitute the same thing as 
support for a war or conflict.  Presidents cannot count on “positive rallies” to last the 
duration of the  war or conflict.  If an act of atrocity occurs after the initial “positive 
rally” period, as is the case with the two case studies presented in this thesis, then it is 
more likely that the incident will be used by the public to help form opinions about 
support for the war or conflict.  When the incident occurs may become increasingly more 
important as the war or conflict drags on and is perceived to be taking too long in the 
public’s estimation.  The next section will further explore the importance of time and 
war-weariness on public opinion.      
F. THE EFFECT OF TIME AND WAR-WEARINESS  
Following the Vietnam War, political scientists generally believed that Americans 
were tired of war.  This assumption was based on the understanding that the Vietnam 
War had captured the attention of the American public for over a decade, dragging on, 
until ultimately culminating in what was generally perceived to be a defeat for the United 
States military.  This phenomenon would eventually become known as the “war-
weariness” hypothesis where “a state’s involvement in war and particularly a long and 
destructive war, reduces the likelihood of its involvement in subsequent wars for a period 
of time.”15  Belief in war-weariness from the Vietnam War led to a “Vietnam 
Syndrome,” “a term coined by conservatives to refer to the popular refusal on the part of 
the American public to support major military interventions in third world countries 
following the defeat in Vietnam.”16  Placed into context with the current war in Iraq, 





                                                 
15 Jack S. Levy and Morgan T. Clifton, “The War Weariness Hypothesis: An Empirical Test,” 
American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1, (February 1986): 46. 
16 Anonymous, “Is Iraq Another Vietnam?” Monthly Review 56, no. 2, (June 2004): 5.   
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Anything that would appear to be a defeat would bring back the ‘Vietnam 
Syndrome.’  The Iraq War was supposed to have marked the final 
recovery from the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ and full restoration of U.S. 
imperial power.17   
Although seemingly plausible, the war-weariness hypothesis did not hold up well to 
empirical testing.  Levy and Clifton’s study concluded that “the probability of [future] 
war was independent of the period of time since the last war.”18  However, as Pickering 
later suggested, “a state’s past war record should be considered when policy makers 
attempt to gauge [public support] for use of military force.”19  While the duration of the 
war or conflict and degree of war-weariness are not particularly strong stand-alone 
variables, they cannot be completely discounted either.  This is because war has a sunk 
cost in terms of time, treasure, and troops expended.  The longer the duration of the war 
or conflict, the greater is its cost.   This relationship suggests a threshold for what the 
public will and will not tolerate.  Wars expend an administration’s social capital with the 
American people, especially as these conflicts drag on.  When an administration’s social 
capital is already low because of a lengthy war or conflict, acts of atrocity cannot help but 
further undermine public opinion support by expending already depleted social capital 
resources.  This can be especially costly for an administration if the duration of the war or 
conflict has resulted in significant casualties.  The next section will explore the effect of 
military and civilian casualties on public opinion support.         
G. CASUALTIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESS  
Mueller examined the Korean and Vietnam Wars and concluded that: 
Support for each war, high at first, declined as a logarithmic function of 
American casualties—quickly at first, then more slowly.  [This is known 
as the cumulative casualties hypothesis,] where support drops some fifteen 
percentage points whenever the casualties increase tenfold—for example, 
from one thousand to ten thousand or from ten thousand to a hundred 
thousand.20   
                                                 
17 Anonymous, “Is Iraq Another Vietnam?” 5.   
18 Levy and Morgan, “The War-Weariness Hypothesis,” 46.   
19 Jeffrey Pickering, “War-Weariness and Cumulative Effects: Victors, Vanquished, and Subsequent 
Interstate Intervention,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 3, (May 2002): 334. 
20 Mueller, “Presidential Popularity,” 29.   
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Mueller also predicted a similar pattern for the Gulf War, but was unable to validate his 
theory because of the Gulf War’s short duration.21  Follow-up studies have strengthened 
our understanding of the effect of casualties, revealing the American public’s strong 
sensitivity to but not intolerance for casualties, with slight variations in attitudes across 
groups, geographic regions, and by other characterizations.  The effects are largely 
dependent on how quickly casualties accumulate, the perceived rightness of the war or 
conflict, what issues are at stake, and the public’s perceptions of success or failure.22  Of 
these factors, the expectation of success appears to be most crucial in times of war.23  
These studies put away once and for all any myths that the American public is anything 
less than capable making rational decisions based on logical conclusions drawn from 
available information about the costs and benefits of American actions.   This suggests 
that the American public is actually “pretty prudent” in its decision-making about war or 
conflict.24   
                                                 
21 John E. Muller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1994): 77. 
22 William A. Boettcher III and Michael D. Cobb, “Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty Framing and Public 
Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6, (December 2006), 
832; Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening, “All Politics are Local: Local Losses and Individual Attitudes 
Towards the Vietnam War,” 691; Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “Success Matters: 
Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” International Security 30, no. 3, (Winter 2005/2006): 44-45; 
Klarevas, Gelpi, and Reifler, “Correspondence: Casualties, Polls, and the Iraq War,” 196-198; Eric Larson 
and Bogdan Savych, “Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for 
U.S. Military Operations,” (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand, 1996), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR726/index.html  (accessed April 27, 2007). 
23 Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, “Success Matters,” 8; Gartner and Segura, “War, Casualties, and Public 
Opinion,” 298; and Klarevas, Gelpi, and Reifler, “Correspondence: Casualties, Polls, and the Iraq War,” 
186. 
24 Kernell, “Explaining Presidential Popularity,”; Alexander L. George, “Domestic Constraints on 
Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy,” as cited in Changes in the 
International System, Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1980); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Changes in American’s Policy 
Preferences, 1935-1979,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 46, no. 1, (Spring 1982); Robert Y. Shapiro and 
Benjamin I. Page, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 2, 
(June 1988); Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public”; Jentleson and Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent”; Robert 
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Gartner and Segura criticized Mueller for his use of cumulative casualties as the 
exclusive predictor of public opinion support, arguing instead for the importance of 
marginal casualties.  They concluded that: 
[Cumulative casualties] cannot help but be correlated with time; [as 
cumulative casualties] homogenize conflicts with very different patterns of 
accumulation; and the exclusive use of cumulative casualties 
underestimates the importance of turning points, decisive events, and 
exogenous shocks to opinion.25   
Their findings are particularly relevant to this study of significant military misconduct 
because of their suggestion that public opinion can be affected by turning points, decisive 
events, or shocks.  Logically, acts of atrocity could fall into one if not all of these three 
categories.  Similarly, the recent studies of Boettcher and Cobb and Eichenberg, Stoll, 
and Lebo also highlight the importance of dramatic events during wartime and their 
effect on public approval.26   
Also important is Burk’s application of Mueller’s casualties hypothesis to 
peacekeeping operations.  Burk’s study is useful because it helps provide insight into 
public opinion support for military operations that are not quite war.  He found that: 
The public will not support [peacekeeping] deployments that result in U.S. 
casualties; support for an operation will be abruptly withdrawn if 
casualties unexpectedly occur; and public opinion is so powerful that it 
constrains the use of force by great powers.27   
Interestingly, he also concluded that public opinion support for these types of operations 
was usually already formed before any casualties were taken; that the public is pretty 
rational about casualties and what to expect from use of military force; and that the public 
will support [limited] casualties during humanitarian missions as long as the objectives 
are clear.28  Burk’s conclusions about peacekeeping operations are broadly consistent 
                                                 
25 Gartner and Segura, “War, Casualties, and Public Opinion,” 280. 
26 Boettcher and Cobb, “Echoes of Vietnam?” 850 and Richard C. Eichenberg, Richard J. Stoll, and 
Matthew Lebo, “War President: The Approval Ratings of George W. Bush,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 50, no. 6, (December 2006): 783.   
27 James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties 
Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1, (Spring 1999): 77-78.   
28 Ibid. 
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with what is known about public opinion support during wartime.  Although public 
support for peacekeeping operations is a little different from regular war, the public’s 
sensitivity to casualties in both cases appears to hinge more on what is at stake during the 
operation and whether the objectives are clear.   
Recently, Mueller applied his cumulative casualties hypothesis to the Iraq War, 
noting that public support has: 
Declined far more quickly; [suggesting the development of an] ‘Iraq 
syndrome,’ [which means] Americans will have a strong aversion to 
embarking on such ventures again.29   
Gelpi publicly disputed Mueller’s “Iraq syndrome” theory, arguing instead that: 
As the likelihood of obtaining benefits diminishes, the human cost of war 
becomes less tolerable, and subsequent casualties further reduce support 
for the operation…similarly, when the public is optimistic about a 
successful outcome, it is far more willing to bear the human cost of war.30   
He attributes the “advance of technology as the catalyst for changing the level of 
necessary casualties the public believes success requires.”31  Mueller and Gelpi’s recent 
studies on Iraq are useful because they again emphasize the strong relationship between 
the public’s perceptions of success or failure and its subsequent tolerance for casualties.  
Their conclusions about the Iraq War show that public perceptions of success or failure 
have held up quite consistently across wars and conflicts.   
The most recent study on the effect of casualties during wartime and conflict 
came from Larson and Savych.  They evaluated the public’s reaction to civilian casualties 
as opposed to military casualties in wartime and conflict, finding that “sensitivity to 
civilian casualties has varied somewhat across past U.S. military operations.”32  Three of 
their seven conclusions are particularly relevant: “the public does understand the reality 
                                                 
29 John Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6, (November/December 2005): 44. 
30 Christopher Gelpi and John Mueller, “The Cost of War,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1, 
(January/February 2006): 139. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, “Misfortunes of War: Press and Public Reactions to Civilian 
Deaths in Wartime,” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Project Air Force, 2006), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG441.pdf (accessed April 22, 2007) xix-xii. 
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of civilian casualties in wartime; the press will report heavily on incidents involving 
civilian casualties; and finally, it is as important to get the story right as it is to get the 
story out when civilian casualties occur.”33  Also significant was their finding of a high 
level of trust or social capital between the military and the American people.34  They 
conclude “the high level of trust Americans have that the U.S. military is trying to avoid 
civilian deaths may in part be accountable to the high levels of confidence that most 
Americans express in the U.S. military and its leadership and the high level credibility 
that serving military officers have with the U.S. public.”35  Their findings about public 
reaction to civilian casualties are interesting in that they are similar to the effect of 
military casualties on public opinion support, especially when understood in the context 
of a rational public capable of drawing logical conclusions.  This study also has some 
direct application in the sense that the accidental or intentional killing of innocent 
civilians could easily qualify as an act of atrocity.  However, perhaps of greatest 
significance is Larson and Savych’s suggestion of a unique relationship built on trust 
between the military and the American public.  What is missing here is how much of an 
effect acts of atrocity may have on this relationship and how this relates to public opinion 
support for the war or conflict. 
H. METHODOLOGY  
 The thirty-seven years of exhaustive research following Mueller’s Vietnam-era 
study on public opinion have corrected problems of logic and data, while validating and 
improving upon his original findings.  The scholarly literature goes far in identifying and 
explaining the effects of rallies, time and war-weariness, casualties, and perceptions of 
success from the “pretty prudent public,” and its subsequent level of support for a war or 
conflict.  One potentially important independent variable not yet evaluated is the effect of 
acts of atrocity on public opinion support during wartime or conflict.  Do these acts of 
atrocity affect public opinion in a significant manner or are they merely “bumps and 
                                                 
33 Larson and Savych, “Misfortunes of War,” 209-210. 
34 Ibid., 208-211. 
35 Ibid., 209-210. 
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wiggles”36 in the public support line?  Are breaches of trust by the military useful for 
explaining the larger phenomenon of public opinion support?  
 To address these important questions, this thesis undertook a controlled 
comparison case study using two famous acts of atrocity to examine their subsequent 
effect(s) on public opinion support during the war or conflict in which they occurred.  
The two cases are the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal during the Iraq War.  The independent variables (IV) are the acts of 
atrocity that are believed to lower public opinion support (the dependent variable or DV) 
during times of war or conflict.   These case studies were chosen for their differing types 
of misconduct and because the incidents occurred during separate conflicts, late enough 
for the “rally ‘round the flag” effect to have subsided, and, finally, because both were 
subject to elite framing and widespread media coverage that captured the attention of 
most American citizens, who likely formed opinions about these incidents.  Utilizing pre-
existing public opinion timelines, I will attempt to identify causal relationships between 
acts of atrocity and public opinion support.  For analysis of the case studies, a controlled 
comparison study using Mill’s “method of difference” is most appropriate to account for 
the effects of the other variables already proven to affect public opinion.  I hypothesize 
that acts of atrocity perpetrated by the military during times of war or conflict undermine 
public opinion support, at least in the short-term.  Analysis of available polling data from 
sources such as the Pew Foundation and Gallup are used to examine whether there is a 
causal relationship between these types of incidents and a subsequent drop in public 
opinion support during the timeframes in question.  Analysis of the available data should 
offer a better understanding of public opinion support during war.   
 Examination of both cases revealed that the hypothesis receives greater support in 
the Abu Ghraib case than for the My Lai case, although data limitations in the My Lai 
case make it difficult to be sure that this incident did not have a negative effect on public 
opinion support for the Vietnam War.  Together, both cases suggest that the negative 
impact of atrocities on public opinion is likely to be modest and short-lived.  
Nevertheless, the potential loss of public support over the short-term appears to be 
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significant enough that military and civilian leaders should do whatever they can to 
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II. THE MY LAI MASSACRE 
A. BACKGROUND: PUBLIC OPINION, VIETNAM, AND MY LAI 
 Thirty-five years have passed since the end of the war, yet public opinion about 
Vietnam remains divided, complex, and confusing.  Political scientists have struggled to 
explain the complexities of this conflict by developing a series of modern public opinion 
theories that enhance our understanding of the Vietnam conflict as well as those that we 
are currently waging.  These theories are useful, but less than perfect.  None are truly 
stand-alone theories, capable of explaining all of the intricacies of public opinion in a 
complex wartime or conflict environment.  When synthesized they can take us most of 
the way towards explaining why the public chose to support or not support conflicts, yet 
almost always they fall short, leaving many questions unanswered.  Such is the case for 
an examination of the My Lai massacre.  The modern theories take us part of the way 
towards understanding America’s response to this incident, but they fall short in 
explaining how it affected public opinion support for the larger war.  In an effort to 
analyze this incident and its subsequent effects, modern theories must be analyzed with 
the historical record and the sparse public opinion polling data we have available for this 
period.  An analysis of this sort helps explain My Lai’s effect on the war effort; 
nevertheless, some subjectivity is required to draw any conclusions.  Unfortunately, the 
results were rather disappointing, because for My Lai, there are simply not enough 
polling questions asked at the right times with the right consistency to draw the kind of 
irrefutable conclusions about the effect this incident had on the war as a whole.  
However, this case study is important because it allows us to begin to develop a 
framework necessary for analyzing future cases of atrocities in combat and how they may 
affect public opinion support for the larger war or conflict.     
B. THE HAMLET AND THE ORDERS GIVEN 
My Lai-4 was actually a sub-hamlet of the Tu Chung hamlet, Son My Village, 
Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, in the former Republic of South Vietnam.  At 
the time of the massacre, Son My Village was comprised of four hamlets, Tu Cung, My 
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Lai, My Khe, and Co Luy, each with their respective sub-hamlets.37  Although the sub-
hamlets of Son My Village were numbered on U.S. military maps, village and hamlet 
boundaries did not necessarily correspond with names of sub-hamlets located within their 
boundaries, and most had other Vietnamese names, which frequently caused confusion 
for occupying forces.  During the Vietnam War, U.S. Army Corps of Engineer maps 
marked areas of high population density with a pink shading.  The Son My Village area 
was affectionately known to U.S. GIs as “Pinkville” for its high population density and 
history of strong Viet Cong resistance.38   This mountainous region, located on the 
northeast coast of South Vietnam, along the South China Sea, had long been a hotspot of 
insurgent activity dating back as early as the sixteenth century.39  Previous U.S. efforts to 
free this region from Viet Cong control had failed miserably, so ultimately the province 
was declared a “free fire zone,” where “all civilians were automatically suspected of 
being Viet Cong or Viet Cong sympathizers.  [Subsequently,] U.S. Forces did not need to 
get approval from Saigon or local officials before staging bombing missions and artillery 
attacks.”40  
 In January 1968, an Army task force (TF) was formed to occupy this region and 
quell Viet Cong activity.  Named TF Barker after its commander, Lt. Colonel Frank 
Barker, the task force consisted of three companies: Company A, 3rd Battalion, 1st 
Infantry; Company B, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry; and Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th 
Infantry.41  During the period of March 16-18, 1968, TF Barker planned to conduct a 
three day “search and destroy” operation in the Son My area to locate, trap, and destroy 
the 48th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion that was using area as its base of operations.42  
                                                 
37 Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz, The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up: 
Beyond the Reach of the Law? (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 59; Lieutenant General William R. 
Peers, United States Army (Retired), The My Lai Inquiry (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979), 
41; and David L. Anderson, Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre, (Lawrence, Kansas: The 
University of Kansas Press, 1998), 2-3.   
38 Ibid.   
39 Seymour M. Hersh My Lai-4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath (New York: Random 
House, 1970), 3. 
40 Ibid., 5.   
41 Goldstein, Marshall, and Schwartz, The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up, 80; Peers, The My Lai 
Inquiry, 39;  Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim Four Hours in My Lai (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 65.  
42 Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 87-88. 
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According to the intelligence given by the task force intelligence officer, all village 
inhabitants (non-combatants) would depart for the markets of Quang Ngai City by no 
later than 7:00 a.m., leaving only the 48th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion in the village.   
Strong enemy resistance was expected.43    
Charlie Company was commanded by Captain Ernest Medina, with Second 
Lieutenants William L. Calley, Stephen K. Brooks, and Jeffery U. LaCross, serving as 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd Platoon Leaders respectively.44  On the first day of the operation, Charlie 
Company was to conduct a combat air assault from a landing zone west of My Lai-4, 
attacking enemy forces located in the sub-hamlet and pushing any enemy stragglers east 
towards Bravo Company, which was to form a blocking force, preventing the enemy 
from escaping.45  According to the official U.S. Army inquiry conducted by Lieutenant 
General William Peers, Captain Medina told his men that they were to “burn the houses, 
kill the livestock, and destroy the crops and foodstuffs.  By telling [Charlie Company] 
that no civilians would be present in strength, and by not issuing any instructions as to 
how to deal with civilians, he created the impression in the minds of many men in his 
company that they were to destroy everything in the area.”46  
C. THE MASSACRE 
The assault on My Lai-4 on March 16, 1968, began with a brief artillery attack to 
soften the landing zone and western portion of the hamlet in preparation for the arrival of 
the assault force.  Following the artillery barrage, helicopter gunships rocketed and 
strafed the landing zone.  Subsequently, the first portion of Charlie Company landed and 
found a “cold” landing zone (LZ) completely free of enemy fire.47   Over the course of a 
four hour period, the men of Charlie Company swept through My Lai-4, shooting and 
bayoneting numerous Vietnamese civilians attempting to flee the area; throwing hand 
                                                 
43 Goldstein, Marshall, and Schwartz, The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up, 90; Peers, The My Lai 
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grenades indiscriminately into houses and bunkers full of women, children, and old 
people; destroying livestock, crops, and the village water supply; raping several women; 
burning houses; and committing numerous other atrocities.48  One conscientious soldier 
named Thomas Partsch recorded the following entry in his journal, capturing the 
morning’s events:   
We started to move slowly through the village, shooting everything in 
sight, children, men, women, and animals.  Some [of it] was sickening.  
Their legs were shot off and they were still moving.  They were just 
hanging there.  I think their bodies were made of rubber.  I didn’t fire a 
single round and didn’t kill anybody, not even a chicken.  I couldn’t.49    
Soon, Lieutenant Calley’s 1st Platoon found itself standing guard over a large group of 
about sixty Vietnamese civilians.50  Impatient about the platoon’s slow progress through 
the hamlet, Captain Medina called for a situation report.  Calley radioed that a large 
group of civilians was slowing down the platoon.  Medina told Calley to “get rid of 
them.”  Calley then ordered two of his men, Paul Meadlo and Dennis Conti to “take care 
of them.”  The men replied that they were taking care of them by “watching over them.”  
Calley then clarified: “No, I want them killed.  Fire when I say fire.”  Calley and Meadlo 
then opened fire on the civilians, killing all sixty of them.51  Continuing to push their way 
through the village, Calley’s platoon rounded up more Vietnamese civilians, eventually 
herding them into a large irrigation ditch at the end of the village.  Calley, Meadlo, and 
others opened fire, killing dozens of unarmed civilians.  Witnesses would later report that 
those killed in the ditch numbered between seventy-five to one hundred fifty civilians.52   
Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson Jr., orbiting the village by helicopter, observed 
dozens of Vietnamese bodies in the bottom of the drainage ditch.  Landing his helicopter, 
Thompson made contact with Calley to ask him what was going on.  Apparently 
frustrated with the answers he received, Thompson took off again and several minutes 
                                                 
48 Seymour M. Hersh, Cover-up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai (New 
York: Random House, 1972), 3 and Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 173.  
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later observed Calley’s platoon shooting people in the ditch.  At the same time, he 
observed a small group of Vietnamese attempting to seek shelter in a bunker, being 
chased by members of Brooks’ 2nd platoon.  Again landing his helicopter, Thompson, his 
crew chief Glenn Andreotta, and his door gunner Lawrence Colburn, made contact with 
Lieutenant Brooks telling him that they wanted to evacuate the civilians.  Brooks told 
him that the only way that this was possible was by using hand grenades.  Thompson then 
managed to coax the Vietnamese out of the bunker and load them onto several waiting 
helicopter gunships that had landed to assist with the rescue.  Departing the area to refuel, 
Thompson made another pass over the irrigation ditch, when his crew observed 
movement.  Landing for the third time, he ordered his crew to check the ditch.  They 
returned with a three-year old Vietnamese child, covered in blood but otherwise 
uninjured.  Evacuating the child to a hospital in Quang Ngai, Thompson returned to base 
and reported Charlie Company’s actions to his commander, Major Fred Watke.  Major 
Watke reported Thompson’s allegations to Lt. Col Barker, who contacted his Operations 
Officer Major Charles Calhoun.  Calhoun then contacted Medina and ordered Charlie 
Company to cease fire.53  
D. THE COVER-UP  
 Efforts to conceal the My Lai massacre occurred at all levels of the chain of 
command, starting at the individual soldier level of Charlie Company and extending up 
the chain to the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).  According to the 
Peers Inquiry:   
[Some] did it deliberately, others unknowingly.  Some actively suppressed 
information, others withheld it, and still others were responsible by merely 
not wanting to become involved.  Many commanders were aware of at 
least some of the troubling aspects of the operation.54 
After completion of the operation, Captain Medina informed his men at base 
camp that the incident at My Lai was under investigation and they were not to talk about 
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it.  Perhaps most egregious were his instructions to Private First Class Michael Bernhardt, 
who was told not to write his congressman until after the investigation was completed.55  
Lieutenant Colonel Barker’s sterilized after-action report failed to mention the extensive 
number of civilian casualties, giving the impression that nothing abnormal had occurred.  
Several members of Barker’s staff heard the radio traffic initiated by Thompson and the 
other helicopter pilots during the massacre but failed to do anything about it.  They also 
doctored the civilian casualty logs and changed the location where a substantial number 
of VC were killed during the opening artillery barrage to make it appear that the artillery 
fire killed the civilians.56  Similarly, the Americal Division commander, Major General 
Koster, who was flying over the village in his command helicopter during the assault, and 
his staff failed to report the civilian casualties they were aware of, even after they 
received a letter from the South Vietnamese officials alleging the deaths of between 400-
500 civilians.57  The official U.S. Army inquiry into the matter would later confirm that 
General Koster and his deputy, Brigadier General Young, were in fact informed of 
Warrant Officer Thompson’s accusations by as early as the 17th of March.  Neither 
reported the allegations of war crimes up the chain of command as required and, instead, 
inappropriately appointed the 11th Brigade commander, Colonel Henderson, to conduct 
an informal inquiry into the matter.  Later, Colonel Henderson provided an oral report to 
Generals Young and Koster, giving the impression that he had conducted a thorough 
investigation when in fact he had not.  When questioned during the inquiry, Colonel 
Henderson claimed that General Young directed him to have the task force commander, 
Lt. Colonel Barker, conduct an official inquiry, a claim that General Young denied.  No 
copies of Lt. Colonel Barker’s official report were ever found, and witnesses who 




                                                 
55 Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 201.   
56 Ibid.   
57 Peers, The My Lai Inquiry, 206 and Hersh, My Lai-4, 99. 
 21
made statements.  Numerous other officers at different levels of the chain of command all 
the way up to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) also failed to act upon 
information in their possession.58    
E. THE UNCOVERING 
The story of the My Lai massacre would have remained forever buried if not for 
the efforts of a young Vietnam veteran named Ronald Ridenhour.  Ridenhour had heard 
about the massacre from former members of Charlie Company who were present at My 
Lai-4.  Concerned about what he had been told, he returned to the United States and 
within a year wrote letters detailing the massacre to the president, several members of 
Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Pentagon.59  Ultimately, Ridenhour’s letter 
prompted the Army’s official investigation into the matter.  Army Chief of Staff General 
William Westmoreland appointed Lieutenant General William Peers to head an official 
inquiry into the matter, while the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) opened a 
criminal case.  According to Bilton and Sim:  
CID looked at the crimes committed during the actual combat mission—
murder, rape, and assault.  Peers examined the aftermath, possible cover-
up, and charges of negligence and dereliction of duty.60   
CID uncovered enough evidence to charge thirty men with specific crimes.61  
However, taking a conservative approach, the Department of the Army decided to pursue 
charges only against those soldiers who were still serving on active duty.  This amounted 
to four officers and nine enlisted men.62  The two Captains—Kotouc, the brigade 
intelligence officer, and Medina, the Charlie Company commander—were court-
martialed and found not guilty.  Lieutenant Calley was eventually found guilty of 
premeditated murder during his trial by court-martial, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  His sentence was later reduced to twenty years by the reviewing 
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authority, and then to ten years by the Secretary of the Army.  President Nixon freed him 
from confinement, ordering him to be placed under house arrest in his own quarters until 
his appeal was finalized.  Eventually, he was paroled after serving approximately four 
and a half months.63  The remaining enlisted men were found not guilty during court-
martials or had their charges dismissed before trial.  The other members of Charlie 
Company, who were no longer on active duty, were excused from prosecution.64   
Fourteen officers were formally charged following the Peers Inquiry.  Lt. Col 
Barker had been killed in a helicopter crash in June of 1968, so although he could not 
face prosecution, his role in the massacre was investigated.  With the exception of 
Colonel Henderson, who was acquitted during a trial by court-martial, all charges were 
eventually dropped against the other officers.  Major General Koster was removed from 
his post as Superintendent of West Point, demoted to Brigadier General, and lost his 
Distinguished Service Medal from Vietnam.  Brigadier General Young was issued a letter 
of censure and also lost his Distinguished Service Medal from Vietnam.65   
Interestingly, the American public was first made aware of the massacre at My 
Lai almost twenty months after the incident occurred.  Although a short news release had 
been issued to the press on September 5, 1969, announcing Calley’s court-martial, it 
contained no details of the atrocities at My Lai.66  Revelation of the massacre occurred on 
November 13, 1969, when Seymour Hersh’s story of the incident was published by thirty 
major newspapers in the United States.67  Press reporting, initially heavy during 
November 1969-March 1970, continued sporadically until Calley’s petition to the 
Supreme Court was made final in October 1975.   
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F. MEDIA PRIMING AND THE INITIAL PUBLIC RESPONSE 
Public opinion response to My Lai is interesting yet puzzling at the same time.  
Informal polling conducted by The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, 
Minneapolis Tribune, and Time magazine revealed that many Americans either: 
Refused to believe the mass killings had taken place; wondered why the 
incident was attracting so much attention; or believed that such incidents 
were bound to take place during war.68   
Rather than direct their anger towards Calley or the other perpetrators of the incident, 
much of America’s anger was directed instead at the news media who were reporting it.69  
Following his television interview with Paul Meadlo, who admitted to shooting innocent 
Vietnamese civilians alongside Calley, CBS News correspondent Mike Wallace received 
over a hundred angry telephone calls from upset viewers.70  Similarly, major newspapers 
such as the Washington Star and Cleveland Plain Dealer received numerous complaints 
for publishing pictures of the massacre.71   
G. ELITE INFLUENCE 
Protests over the press’s revelation of the incident came to a head in mid-
December when congressional hawks passed a House resolution “praising each 
serviceman and veteran of Vietnam for his individual sacrifice, bravery, dedication,  
initiative, and devotion to duty.”72  There was equally strong rhetoric from congressional 
doves, such as Senator George McGovern, a liberal South Dakota Democrat who 
remarked:  
I think for the first time millions of Americans are realizing that we have 
stumbled into a conflict where we not only of necessity commit horrible 
atrocities against the people of Vietnam, but where in a sense we  brutalize 
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our own people and our own nation.  I think it’s more than Lieutenant 
Calley involved here.  I think a national policy is on trial.73   
President Nixon made his first formal statement about the My Lai incident during an 
official press conference held on December 8, 1969.  He stated:  
What appears was certainly a massacre, under no circumstances was it 
justified…We cannot condone or use atrocities against civilians to achieve 
the United States goal of preventing the Vietnamese people from having 
imposed upon them a government which has atrocity against civilians as 
one of its policies.74   
While publicly denouncing the incident, Nixon privately believed that the news media 
had effectively turned the American public against the war in Vietnam.  Later, in his 
memoirs he would comment:  
From the time it first became public, the whole tragic episode was used by 
the media and the antiwar forces to chip away at our efforts to build public 
support for our Vietnam objectives and policies.75   
Privately, Nixon did what he could to minimize his administration’s involvement in the 
incident, directing his press secretary to remind the public that the incident occurred 
under President Johnson’s watch.76 
H. THE MY LAI POLL AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Unfortunately, there is little useful public opinion polling data that can be directly 
applied to the My Lai incident.  Gallup Poll #795, conducted over a three-day period 
from 12/12/1969-12/15/1969, is the only public opinion data available that directly 
measures how Americans felt about the massacre.   Although it does not tell us how the 
incident impacted public opinion about the war, it is, nevertheless, important, because in 
order to understand the massacre’s broader impact on public opinion support for the war, 
it is first necessary to understand America’s feelings about the massacre itself.  The poll, 
                                                 
73 Hersh, My Lai-4, 157-158.   
74 Hersh, My Lai-4, 165, and “Rivers Differs With Nixon on Songmy,” The New York Times, 
December 10, 1969. 
75 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), 500.     
76 Michael R. Belknap, The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of 
Lieutenant Calley, (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 2002), 135.   
 25
conducted roughly one month after the incident was made public, allowed enough time 
for opinions about My Lai to crystallize.  A three-part question was used to poll a random 
sample of 3,265 Americans regarding My Lai.  Specific questions were: 
2a. Have you heard or read about the report of the shooting of women and 
children by U.S. soldiers in the Vietnam village of Song My or My Lai?”; 
“2b. Should the soldiers who took part in the shooting be punished or 
not?”; and 2c) “Why do you feel this way?77    
Of the 3,265 who answered the first and second questions, 91 percent had heard or read 
about the incident, but only 22 percent believed the soldiers should be punished, while 45 
percent believed they should not.  Roughly 27 percent chose to answer “no opinion” on 
the matter.  Only those respondents answering yes or no (2,195) were asked the third part 
of the question: “Why do you feel this way?”  Of those who answered no, the most 
popular explanations from roughly 15 percent was “They did as they were told,” followed 
by 12 percent who remarked, “It is war,” and 9 percent who said “They are there to do a 
job.”78      
 Based on the high number of respondents who were aware of the incident at My 
Lai, one can safely conclude that the majority of Americans was at least paying attention 
to the events surrounding the massacre.  At a minimum, the incident was important 
enough to capture and hold the attention of the American public for almost a month after 
its initial revelation.   No doubt much of this was because of the high level of media 
reporting on My Lai and the elite influence from congressional leaders and President 
Nixon himself.  Knowledge of the incident grew as more and more veterans of the 
massacre came forward to tell their stories in the newspapers and on television.   
Explaining the sample’s response to the second part of the question is more 
problematic.  While it may appear that Americans were insensitive, callous, or even 
lacking in terms of their moral outrage for the massacre of innocent Vietnamese women 
and children, this explanation is not quite adequate.  Rolling forward in time to the 
verdict of Calley’s court-martial, other clues can be found to help decipher this seemingly 
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puzzling response.  Following Calley’s conviction on March 29, 1971, and his formal 
sentencing on the 30th, 79 two public opinion surveys were conducted for President Nixon 
on behalf of the Opinion Research Corporation, first on April 1, 1971, and again on April 
5-6th.80  Although a small sample size, 1,090 and 973 respectively,81 78 percent disagreed 
with the decision of the court to convict Calley and 51 percent believed Nixon should 
free Calley.82  Twenty-eight percent believed his sentence should be reduced 
substantially, while only 9 percent wanted Nixon to uphold Calley’s life imprisonment 
sentence.83   Similarly, a public opinion poll by Louis Harris Associates, also in April, 
1971, revealed that 65 percent of Americans disagreed with the court’s decision; 77 
percent believed that Calley and the soldiers at My Lai were just following orders from 
their higher ups; and 77 percent believed Calley was being singled out as a scapegoat.84  
Finally, Gallup Poll #7145, conducted April 1, 1971 to April 30, 1971, found that for 
1,566 who answered the first part of the question, 79 percent of Americans disagreed 
with the court’s decision; of the 1,236 who answered the second part of the question, 70 
percent believed others besides Calley shared responsibility for what happened; and of 
1,566 who answered the third part of the question, 70 percent believed Calley was being 
made the scapegoat for the actions of others above him.85  Citizens of Georgia, an 
Atlanta-based organization supporting Calley, even went so far as to send President 
Nixon a live billy goat dressed in a red, white, and blue Eisenhower jacket labeled 
“SCAPEGOAT.”86    
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In general terms, public opinion on My Lai had polarized towards one of two 
camps, Hawk or Dove.  As Bilton and Sim point out, both camps thought Calley had 
been treated unfairly: 
On the political left, [the Doves] against the war saw Calley as a victim 
caught up in an immoral war.  They wanted the generals and politicians 
put on trial for war crimes.  Those on the right [the Hawks] thought the 
verdict insulted all American troops fighting in Vietnam and were 
appalled at what their government was doing.87   
Interestingly, both groups found common ground on their response to Calley’s 
conviction.  Although based on differing opinions, both saw his conviction as an 
injustice.88  This is certainly not the response that the researcher would have predicted; 
however, we must remember that the military is one of America’s most trusted 
institutions and remained so even during this troublesome period.   
 Several observations are in order here.  First, some of this response is, no doubt, 
the public’s reaction to the military and government’s failure to hold higher-ups in the 
chain of command responsible for the massacre.  The public did not buy the idea that 
Calley was the sole perpetrator of this incident.  As noted previously, Calley was the only 
officer to be formally convicted during trial by court-martial, and one of only two officers 
who actually faced a full trial by court-martial.89  Also, prior to the release of Hersh’s 
book Cover-Up: The Army’s Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai-4, the partial 
release of the Peers report on November 13, 1974, and the eventual release of Peer’s 
book The My Lai Inquiry in 1979, many of the details of senior officer accountability 
were unknown to the public as most of these sessions and their results were kept 
private.90  The rightness or wrongness of what happened to those senior officers 
notwithstanding, the secrecy surrounding the disposition of their charges seems to have 
done little in terms of satisfying accountability to the American public.   Second, some 
Americans were obviously angered about the press’s reporting of the incident and the 
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subsequent implications these reports had for Calley’s ability to receive a fair trial.91  
Finally, this was a highly emotionally charged incident from the very beginning.  The 
poor perceptions created by how the issue was handled did little to diffuse this 
emotionalism.  One cannot fault the senior level Army officials if their true reasons for 
downplaying the My Lai incident were because of a desire to protect the morale, good 
order, and discipline of those still serving in Vietnam.  Nevertheless, contributing to the 
poor public perception about the massacre was the fact that the Army had known about 
the massacre since 1968 but had not made it known to the public until November 1969; 
the subsequent rumors and reports of a cover-up; the allegations of soldiers being ordered 
by their leadership not to speak about My Lai; the refusal to give details about the 
charges against fourteen accused as a result of the Peers inquiry; the scant details and 
heavy censorship provided to the press once the Peers report was released; and, finally, 
the evasiveness of military officials at official Pentagon news releases.92  Major Harvey 
Brown, one of Calley’s court-martial jurors, would later comment: 
People are not stopping to think, they are letting their emotions rule their 
minds at this point.  They have not sat through four and a half months of a 
trial and heard the facts.  When you conjure up a mental picture of men, 
old men, women, children and babies—that was a rather harsh treatment, 
and a rather final treatment.93   
Finally, turning to the third polling question about My Lai, some general 
observations are in order.  First, it would be unfair and inaccurate to conclude that 
Americans had no regard for the lives of innocent Vietnamese civilians.  Nevertheless, it 
is fair to say that they had certain expectations and understandings of the types of horrible 
things that occur during wartime.94  While inexcusable, the incident was understandable, 
especially in the context of a confusing counter-insurgency style conflict where it was 
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difficult to determine friend from foe while attempting to successfully combat a 
particularly brutal opponent—an opponent that commonly used women and children as 
combatants.  Additionally, by late 1969, America had suffered 47,768 casualties; 1968 
and 1969 were particularly costly years, with 16,592 and 11,616 casualties respectively.95  
The high casualty numbers and the high numbers of Americans who had served in 
Vietnam by this period (over a million96) made the war “up close and personal” for 
many.   According to Lau: 
The war intruded directly and tangibly into the personal lives of a 
substantial number of Americans…by 1968 almost 30 percent of the 
population had relatives or friends who had served in Vietnam.97   
It is highly possible then, that by the end of 1969, roughly four years into the conflict, 
Americans were weary of the war in Vietnam and questioning its associated costs.   By 
this time, a majority of Americans was asking if the war in Vietnam was a mistake. 
I. OPTIONS FOR EXAMINING PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT FOR 
VIETNAM 
There are several different options available for examining public opinion support 
for the Vietnam War.  Support and opposition can be examined by looking at both the 
level and intensity of university protest activity as well as public opinion surveys 
designed to poll a representative cross-section of society.98  Herein lies a problem—
although both are tangible measures of opposition or support, they are not based on the 
same things.  The university protest activity can best be described as opposition to the 
war based on: 
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Moral objections to the use of American military power in Vietnam, 
[while] general public disenchantment, however, seems to have been 
largely practical, springing from the failure of our substantial military 
investments to yield victory [or lack of measurable success despite of elite 
promises at key junctures and the effect of cumulative casualties over 
time].99   
Subsequently, both measures have received a considerable amount of attention from 
political scientists attempting to understand the Vietnam War.  For the purposes of this 
study, I chose to discount the university protest activity as the general consensus of 
scholars is that these protests were focused on the moral critique of the United States 
involvement in Vietnam, and thus are not related to those influences we already know to 
have a stronger effect on public opinion support such as perceptions of success or failure, 
casualties, rallies, elite priming, etc.  Additionally, although scholars disagree on its 
interpretation, there is some evidence to suggest that these protests had little if any effect 
on public opinion support for the war; may have had the unintended consequence of 
lengthening rather than shortening the war because of the blowback they created by 
targeting the military as an institution, rather than the government’s foreign policy 
objectives; and are representative of only a small subsection of society, and not society as 
a whole.100  Nevertheless, there is a link here to understanding public opinion response to 
My Lai, so I will return to the subject of the university protests later.   
J. THE “MISTAKE QUESTION”  
Perhaps the best public opinion polling question available for analysis of support 
for the Vietnam War was “In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in 
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Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?”101  
Commonly known as the “mistake question,” this question is useful because it measures 
generalized war support and was asked repeatedly throughout the duration of the war.102  
The problem with this question is its frequency of appearance.  Specifically, it was asked 
at differing and unpredictable intervals, probably as Mueller suggests, in response to key 
events driving newsworthiness.103     
For My Lai, I was particularly interested in two periods of time:  First, the initial 
revelation of the massacre as reported on November 13, 1969, and continuing as the story 
developed throughout November and December 1969 until reporting tapered off in 
March 1970, after fourteen officers were charged with offenses related to My Lai.  
Second, the period of time immediately following Calley’s court-martial conviction on 
March 29, 1971.104  The results are rather discouraging as there are simply not enough 
mistake question data points available to get a precise picture of what effect My Lai may 
have had on public opinion support for Vietnam.  Nevertheless, some conclusions can be 
drawn about the effect of My Lai from the available data and historical record.   
 Gallup first asked the mistake question in the American Institute of Public 
Opinion (AIPO) poll #0716, conducted August 27, 1965 to September 1, 1965,105 
possibly in response to the first major U.S. ground operation, Operation Starlite, 
conducted August 18-24, 1965.106  Following the predictable rally ’round the flag 
pattern, support was initially fairly high, with 60.38% of 3,525 polled stating the Vietnam 
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War was not a mistake.107  Support continued until May, 1966, when it dropped below 50 
percent to 48.52%,108 possibly as a result of the Fulbright hearings conducted in February 
and March, 1966.109  By the end of 1966, American casualties had climbed to 6,000.110  
Beginning in April 1967, support began a steady decline from which it would never 
recover, consistently falling below a 50 percent majority, until it reached an all-time low 
of 28.59% in January 1973 when Gallup stopped asking this question.111  It is important 
to mention that several significant events occurred in 1967 and 1968 but failed to have 
significant impact on public opinion support for the war as measured by the “mistake 
question,” specifically, the March on the Pentagon anti-war protest, the Battle of Dak To, 
Secretary of Defense McNamara’s resignation over President Johnson’s Vietnam 
strategy, the siege at Khe Sahn, the Tet Offensive, President Johnson’s decision not to 
run for re-election, the stalled Paris peace talks, etc.112   
K. USING THE MISTAKE QUESTION TO ANALYZE THE EFFECT OF MY 
LAI 
While preparing the Vietnam “mistake question” data for analysis, I noticed that 
the different sources reporting Gallup’s polling numbers from this era did not always 
match.  Specifically, I found rounding inconsistencies, polling dates that did not line up, 
and differing numbers, depending on whether the missing data/no code columns were 
                                                 
107 Survey by Gallup Organization. August 27-September 1, 1965, Retrieved August 30, 2007 from 
the IPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.  
108 The Vietnam “mistake question” charts were built using data recorded at two places past the 
decimal point. This is useful because it allows for the detection of even the slightest changes in public 
opinion support, which is necessary for the My Lai case study and its few data points.  However, Gallup’s 
official position is that this gives a false sense of precision to the data which inherently has a plus or minus 
3 percent margin of error built in.  Survey by Gallup Organization. May 5-10, 1966, Retrieved August 30, 
2007 from the IPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut, <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.  
109 Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, 53.   
110 Ibid., 56.   
111 Survey by Gallup Organization. January 12-15, 1973, Retrieved August 30, 2007 from the IPOLL 
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>.   
112 Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, 57, and The History Place, The Vietnam War: The 
Jungle War 1965-1968, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1965.html (accessed July 
19, 2007). 
 33
included in the calculations.  The compilations of the different data sources are included 
at the end of the chapter.  Using Roper reports, I recalculated all of the mistake question 
data to ensure consistency.  I removed the missing data/no code information from the 
results by subtracting it from the sample size and then recalculating the percentages.  The 
results are a more accurate representation of the actual opinion that could be measured.  
Those answering yes to the mistake question were placed in the opposition column while 
those answering no were placed in the support column.  A summary of the re-calculated 
results of the Gallup “mistake question” for the My Lai period is included in Table 2-1 
below.  A table of the re-calculated results of the Gallup “mistake question” for the entire 
Vietnam War period is included at the end of the chapter.   
 
Date Day # # Days Between Support Oppose No Opinion % Change in Support Rate of Decline
Sep 26-Oct 1, 1968 25112 50 37.33 53.46 9.2 0.9 0.54
Jan 23-28, 1969 25231 119 39.65 51.16 9.18 2.32 0.5848
Sep 17-22, 1969 25468 237 32.21 57.85 9.92 -7.44 -0.9417
Jan 15-20, 1970 25588 120 32.62 57.42 9.94 0.41 0.1025
Apr 2-7, 1970 25665 77 34.55 51.12 14.31 1.93 0.7519
May 21-26, 1970 25714 49 34.85 56.72 8.41 0.3 0.1836
Jan 8-11, 1971 25944 230 31.3 59.73 8.96 -3.55 -0.463
May 14-17, 1971 26070 126 28.03 61.97 9.99 -3.27 -0.7785
Jan 12-15, 1973 26679 609 28.59 61.71 9.68 0.56 0.0275
Entire War 2693 -31.79 -0.3541
Before My Lai 1482 -28.17 -0.5702
My Lai Period 197 2.34 0.3563
After My Lai 1091 -4.03 -0.0998  
 
Table 2-1. Summary of Gallup Mistake Question Vietnam (Corley Recalculated).113 
 
The data for the mistake question reveals a significant drop in war support from Gallup’s 
first data point in August 1965, until September 1969, the last polling point before the 
release of the My Lai story in November.  During this period, support for the Vietnam 
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War fell 28.17% over a four year period.114  Similarly, the net drop in support for the 
entire war period (from August 1965 to January 1973) was 31.79%.115  Although war 
support declined gradually over time, by September 1969, the rate of opposition had 
slowed considerably.  This was likely a result of Nixon’s Vietnamization plan and 
subsequent troop withdrawals as America’s involvement in the war was beginning to 
wind down.   
Turning to the mistake question for the first period (November 1969-March 
1970), by September 1969, we find that support for the war was sitting at 32.21%, while 
opposition to the war was at 57.85%.116  By the January 1970 poll, support had actually 
increased .41% to 32.62%, while at the same time, opposition fell .41% to 57.42%.117  
By April 1970, our last polling date bracketing the My Lai incident, support had 
increased by 1.93% to 34.55% and opposition had fallen 6.3% to 51.12%.118   
The results were exactly opposite from what I expected.  We should have seen a 
negative effect on war support for this period in response to My Lai, if the atrocity 
hypothesis held true.  Instead, the data show that support actually increased during this 
timeframe.  However, this slight increase in support is well within Gallup’s plus or minus 
3 percent margin of error for this poll, so it is possible that the results are of little to no 
significance.  On the other hand, if the fluctuation is due to an actual increase in support, 
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as opposed to polling error, then the slightly positive change between the September 1969 
and January 1970 polls could be explained by Nixon’s famous “Silent Majority” speech, 
entitled “The President’s Pursuit of Peace,” given on November 3, 1969.  Nixon’s speech 
could have created a mini-rally at the about same time as the My Lai revelation.  There is 
good historical evidence to support this conclusion.  Specifically, the vocal opposition of 
the anti-war movement had captured the president’s attention by the fall of 1969.  
According to Belknap, “[Nixon] believed the more divided the country seemed, the less 
willing the enemy would be to negotiate an end to the war.”119  As a result, the 
administration launched a national unity campaign, including pro-war demonstrations, 
speeches by supportive legislators, celebrity appearances, newspaper ads, letter writing 
campaigns, etc.120  This effort, designed to rally the country behind the president’s 
Vietnamization and gradual withdrawal strategies, may have been successful, at least as a 
mini-rally.  The evidence to support this conclusion is found in the slight increase in 
public opinion support for the war between the September 1969 and January 1970 polls 
asking the “mistake question,” and a similar increase in public approval for Nixon’s 
handling of the situation in Vietnam, as shown by an increase of a six percentage points 
between the two Gallup polls asking the “Nixon’s handling of the war” questions, 
conducted October 17-20, 1969 and November 14-17, 1969.121  Schuman came to a 
similar conclusion about the likelihood of a mini-rally during this period, adding that the 
war protest demonstration held in Washington during the middle of November 1969 
probably generated more support for the president than increased opposition for the 
war.122  If so, then the anti-war effort helped give Nixon a boost during the same time he 
was attempting to rally the public.  Although Nixon secretly feared the massacre would 
ruin his unity campaign successes,123 it is likely that his efforts to minimize the public 
reaction to the massacre by reminding the public that it occurred under Johnson’s tenure 
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and by returning the onus to the Department of Defense were successful.  Therefore, at 
least for the initial timeframe of the revelation of the massacre, public opinion support for 
the war appears to have already been in a mini-rally period as a result of Nixon’s national 
unity strategy, possibly fueled by the 250,000 person anti-war demonstration held in 
Washington D.C. during the middle of November.124  An interesting question at this 
junction is whether the My Lai incident could have limited the overall effect of the 
president’s rally by slowing or even countering some of its impact?  If so, this would 
mean that the atrocity variable does affect public opinion support, but is less powerful 
than the president’s ability to rally the public.  In this scenario, the effect of My Lai 
would have been hidden by the rally.  Of course the only way to prove this would be to 
run some kind of multivariate analysis to account for the different variables, which was 
not possible with the available data.   
Interestingly, following a short boost in support of 1.93% in April 1970, likely the 
result of Vietnamization, opposition quickly returned to its previous pattern of steady 
decline, although at a slower rate, with the May 1970 “mistake question” poll showing 
56.72% of Americans opposed to the war.125  This drop is probably best explained by 
Nixon’s Cambodian invasion announcement in late April 1970, which proved to be 
extremely unpopular.  Many Americans believed the Cambodian invasion would 
lengthen rather than shorten the war effort at a time when Nixon had promised to 
continue U.S. withdrawal.126  It was this announcement that set off the violent opposition 
to the war’s escalation on college campuses across the nation, ultimately culminating 
with the Kent State massacre.  Opposition to the war increased from 51.12% to 56.72% 
between the April 1970 and May 1970 polls asking the “mistake question.”127  War 
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support actually increased from 34.55% to 34.85% percent at the same time.128  
However, the increase in opposition appears to have come from those previously in the 
undecided category, which dropped from 14.31% to 8.41% between the April and May 
polls.129  Some of the loss of support may be explained by the South Vietnamese failure 
to capitalize on the invasion, achieving little to no measurable success in the campaign by 
allowing the North Vietnamese forces to escape by retreating further into Cambodia.  
Thus, at least for the initial revelation of the massacre period, Nixon’s efforts to rally the 
public were successful or the revelation of the massacre was lost to the public during the 
rally period and subsequent events in the spring of 1970.   
 Evaluation of the second My Lai event period (January 1971-May 1971) is even 
more problematic because of the availability of only two data points five months apart.  
By the January 1971 poll, opposition had climbed to 59.73%.130  By May, it had climbed 
another 2.24% to 61.97%.131  Similarly, war support fell 3.27% from 31.30% to 28.03% 
during the same period.132  The only significant events during this period were Operation 
Lam Son, a failed South Vietnamese effort to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and 
Lieutenant Calley’s court martial conviction.  The failed offensive may have been 
perceived by the public as failure of Nixon’s Vietnamization plan, as the South 
Vietnamese relied heavily on American airpower and artillery, but still could not 
maintain the necessary momentum to cripple the North Vietnamese regulars.133  
Therefore, the failed offensive is somewhat useful as an explanation for the public’s 
                                                 
128 Survey by Gallup Organization. April 2-7, 1970 and May 21-26, 1970, Retrieved August 30, 2007 
from the IPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html> 
129 Ibid. 
130 Survey by Gallup Organization. January 8-11, 1971, Retrieved August 30, 2007 from the IPOLL 
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>   
131 Survey by Gallup Organization. May 14-17, 1971, Retrieved August 30, 2007 from the IPOLL 
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>   
132Survey by Gallup Organization. May 14-17, 1971, Retrieved August 30, 2007 from the IPOLL 
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 
<http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>   
133 The History Place, “The Vietnam War: The Bitter End 1969-1975,” located at 
http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1969.html (accessed July 15, 2007). 
 38
perceptions of success or failure, and in this case failure, during this timeframe.  
Similarly, Mueller’s “war weariness” and casualties hypotheses seem to hold true for this 
period.  Calley’s court-martial conviction falls almost directly in the middle of the two 
polling dates.  We already know from the historical record that the conviction was 
extremely unpopular with the public.  The question is did it hurt war support?  Without 
additional polling data, it would be a stretch to prove that it directly contributed to the 
drop in support.  In reality, it was probably a wash.  True, both Hawks and Doves alike 
were angered by the conviction, but it is unlikely that it did anything more than solidify 
how they already felt about the war.  By February 1971, approximately one month prior 
to Calley’s conviction, 69 percent of Americans believed the Nixon administration was 
not telling them everything they needed to know about the Vietnam War.134  Therefore, 
the administration’s lack of credibility on its Vietnam policy, the failure of South 
Vietnamese forces to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail, war weariness, and casualties are 
stronger explanations for the drop in support during this period. 
L. CONCLUSIONS 
What does the available data suggest about the effect of My Lai on public opinion 
support for the Vietnam War?  There is little evidence to be found in the polling data, 
historical record, or scholarly research to suggest that the My Lai massacre had any 
discernable effect on public opinion support for the war.  By September 1969, public 
opinion support had already fallen 89 percent of its total drop for the entire war.  
Nevertheless, during the initial release of the My Lai incident in November 1969, it 
appears that the nation was in the middle of a successful albeit short presidential effort to 
rally support for Vietnam.  In March 1971, Lieutenant William Calley’s court-martial 
conviction prompted widespread public outrage.  But by the spring of 1971, the public 
was tired of the war, tired of casualties, skeptical of the administration’s Vietnamization 
policy, and had seen little in the way of progress to contribute to its perceptions of 
success.   
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At best, My Lai could represent a bump or wiggle in the public support timeline, 
but again, insufficient data contributes to our inability to identify any shifts caused by the 
incident.  Also problematic is the rally occurring in November and December 1969, 
which may have masked any slight fluctuations in war support.  Logically, any shift 
would have been small and relatively short lived, likely occurring during the initial 
release of the story and not as a result of Calley’s court-martial.   
For My Lai, the combined effect of perceptions of success or failure, the costs of 
war in terms of time and casualties expended, as well as the lesser effect of elite priming, 
in the form of Nixon’s National Unity Campaign, appear to be much stronger variables 
for explaining fluctuations in public opinion support during this timeframe.  Also 
important are the conditions that appeared to have lessened the impact of the massacre—
the length of time elapsed from when the incident occurred until its release in the press 
almost twenty months later, as well as the public’s perception of Lieutenant Calley as a 
scapegoat rather than a war criminal.   
Nevertheless, My Lai did capture the public’s attention.  It did generate much 
media coverage followed by healthy debate and discussion as the nation attempted to sort 
out the moral consequences of how something like this could happen as well as what was 
the right thing to do about it.  It did give momentum to the anti-war protest movement 
founded upon the basis of moral opposition to the war.  It did not have much effect on the 
majority of Americans focused on more practical measures for determining their support 
or opposition for the Vietnam War.  Although much “passion and discussion were 
aroused by unexpected episodes of human drama like...My Lai, [and although] out of 
such discussion comes changes of opinion,”135 this particular episode does not appear to 
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Date Day # # Days Between Support Oppose No Opinion % Change in Support Rate of Decline
Aug 27-Sep 1, 1965 23986 0 60.38 24.14 15.47 0 0
Mar 3-8, 1966 24174 188 58.62 25.5 15.86 -1.76 -0.2808
May 5-10, 1966 24237 63 48.52 36.18 15.29 -10.1 -4.8095
Sep 8-13, 1966 24363 126 48.04 35.04 16.91 -0.48 -28.8
Nov 10-15, 1966 24426 63 51.55 30.89 17.54 3.51 1.6714
Jan 26-31, 1967 24503 77 52.33 31.96 15.69 0.78 0.3038
Apr 19-24, 1967 24586 83 49.81 36.77 13.41 -2.52 -0.9108
Jul 13-18, 1967 24671 85 47.82 41.23 10.93 -1.99 -0.7023
Oct 6-11, 1967 24756 85 43.8 46.64 9.54 -4.02 -1.4188
Dec 7-12, 1967 24818 62 45.69 45.23 9.07 1.89 0.9145
Feb 2-6, 1968 24874 56 42.8 45.4 11.8 -2.89 -1.5482
Feb 22-27, 1968 24895 21 41.8 49.86 8.33 -1 -1.4285
Apr 4-9, 1968 24937 42 39.96 49.33 10.7 -1.84 -1.3142
Aug 7-12, 1968 25062 125 36.43 52.16 11.4 -3.53 -0.8472
Sep 26-Oct 1, 1968 25112 50 37.33 53.46 9.2 0.9 0.54
Jan 23-28, 1969 25231 119 39.65 51.16 9.18 2.32 0.5848
Sep 17-22, 1969 25468 237 32.21 57.85 9.92 -7.44 -0.9417
Jan 15-20, 1970 25588 120 32.62 57.42 9.94 0.41 0.1025
Apr 2-7, 1970 25665 77 34.55 51.12 14.31 1.93 0.7519
May 21-26, 1970 25714 49 34.85 56.72 8.41 0.3 0.1836
Jan 8-11, 1971 25944 230 31.3 59.73 8.96 -3.55 -0.463
May 14-17, 1971 26070 126 28.03 61.97 9.99 -3.27 -0.7785
Jan 12-15, 1973 26679 609 28.59 61.71 9.68 0.56 0.0275
Entire War 2693 -31.79 -0.3541
Before My Lai 1482 -28.17 -0.5702
My Lai Period 197 2.34 0.3563
After My Lai 1091 -4.03 -0.0998  
Table 2-2. Gallup Mistake Question Vietnam (Corley Recalculated)136 
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Date Yes No No Opinion
1973 Jan 12-15 60 29 11
1971 May 14-17 61 28 11
1971 Jan 8-11 60 31 9
1970 May 21-26 56 36 8
1970 Apr 2-7 51 34 15
1970 Jan 15-20 57 32 11
1969 Sep 17-22 58 32 10
1969 Jan 23-28 52 39 9
1968 Sep 26-Oct 1 54 37 9
1968 Aug 7-12 53 35 12
1968 Apr 4-9 48 40 12
1968 Feb 22-27 49 42 9
1968 Feb 1-6 46 42 12
1967 Dec 7-12 45 46 9
1967 Oct 6-11 47 44 9
1967 Jul 13-18 41 48 11
1967 Apr 19-24 37 50 13
1967 Jan 26-31 32 52 16
1966 Nov 10-15 31 52 17
1966 Sep 8-13 35 48 17
1966 May 5-10 36 49 15
1966 Mar 3-8 26 59 15
1965 Aug 27-Sep 1 24 60 16  
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Date Yes No No Opinion No Code/Data
1973 Jan 9 59.87 29.35 10.78 0
1971 May 14-17 49.67 22.85 8.56 18.92
1971 Jan 8-11 59.39 30.9 9.36 0.34
1970 May 22-25 56.07 35.57 8.36 0
1970 Apr 2-7 50.75 34.13 15.12 0
1970 Jan 15-20 51.99 29.38 9.31 9.31
1969 Sep 17-22 55.02 29.96 9.25 5.76
1969 Jan 23-28 51.6 39.32 9.08 0
1968 Sep 26-Oct 1 53.58 37.38 9.04 0
1968 Aug 7-12 53.46 34.87 11.68 0
1968 Apr 4-9 48.17 40.17 11.66 0
1968 Feb 22-27 48.92 41.83 9.19 0.06
1968 Feb 2-6 45.77 41.88 12.35 0
1967 Dec 7-12 43.85 44.73 9 2.42
1967 Oct 6-11 46.56 43.72 9.53 0.19
1967 Jul 13-18 41.24 47.83 10.94 0
1967 Apr 19-24 36.77 49.82 13.41 0
1967 Jan 26-31 31.97 52.33 15.7 0
1966 Nov 10-15 30.67 51.18 17.42 0.74
? ? ? ? ?
1966 May 5-10 36.18 48.51 15.29 0.03
1966 Mar 1-30 25.51 58.62 15.87 0
1965 Aug 27-Sep 1 24.06 60.37 15.46 0.11  
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Date Yes No No Opinion
1973 Jan 60 29 11
1971 May 61 28 11
1971 Jan 59 31 10
1970 May 56 36 8
1970 Apr 51 34 15
*1970 Mar? 58 32 10
1970 Jan 57 33 10
*1969 Oct? 58 32 10
1969 Sep 58 32 10
*Mar 1969? 52 39 9
*1969 Feb? 52 39 9
1968 Early Oct 54 37 9
1968 Aug 53 35 12
*1968 Jul ? 48 40 12
1968 Apr 48 40 12
*1968 Mar? 49 41 10
1968 Early Feb 46 42 12
1967 Dec 45 46 9
1967 Oct 46 44 10
1967 Jul 41 48 11
*1967 May? 37 50 13
*1967 Early Feb? 32 52 16
1966 Nov 31 51 18
1966 Sep 35 48 17
1966 May 36 49 15
1966 Mar 25 59 16
1965 Aug 24 61 15  
Table 2-5. Gallup Mistake Question Vietnam (Gallup Opinion Index)139 
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III. THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON SCANDAL 
A building or a place is not evil…the men who run it make it evil140 
A. BACKGROUND ON THE PRISON 
Located approximately twenty miles west of Baghdad,141 Abu Ghraib was a 
notorious political prison used by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday 
and Qusay.  Originally designed in the 1950s to replace the crumbling Ottoman-era 
prison system in Baghdad, Abu Ghraib was completed by British contractors in 1969, 
coinciding with the takeover of Saddam’s Baathist party.142  During Saddam’s rule, Abu 
Ghraib was a large complex housing a diverse mix of prisoners: 
[Consisting of almost] three miles of 20-foot high cinder block walls and 
24 watchtowers, Abu Ghraib was divided into five sections, each with its 
own walled security perimeter: long-term criminal; short-term criminal; 
the Arabs and foreigners section; the death house; and the political 
section.143   
It was a place where Saddam’s enemies, both real and perceived, were 
tortured, executed, and crammed like cattle into the vilest of living 
conditions.   
According to Hersh: 
As many as fifty thousand men and women—no accurate count is 
possible—were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in twelve-foot-by-
twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.144    
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Similarly, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, former commander of the 800th Military 
Police Battalion, commented that “cells built for twelve to fourteen prisoners held more 
than 100 in Saddam’s day.”145  To correct the problems of overcrowding and make room 
for more prisoners, Uday would routinely sign execution orders for hundreds at a time.146  
U.S. officials estimate that 30,000 Iraqis were executed at Abu Ghraib during Saddam’s 
reign.147  For Iraqis, Abu Ghraib was synonymous with death, having all of the macabre 
instruments of a modern chamber of horrors, including torture rooms with hooks to hang 
prisoners from the ceiling; hanging rooms, complete with pre-made nooses and iron trap 
doors; and gas chambers for those who survived the noose.148 
 Before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Saddam ordered all political prisoners 
executed and then opened the doors to the prison, allowing thousands of hardened 
criminals to escape.  Iraqi looters quickly descended on the facility, dismantling and 
carrying away anything of value, including the copper wiring, plumbing, doors, glass 
windows, and even bricks from the prison walls.149   When U.S. forces arrived at Abu 
Ghraib in March 2003, they found an almost unusable pile of rubble and debris.  
Nevertheless, the twenty foot high outer wall was still mostly intact, so minor 
improvements were made and the facility began to be used as a temporary holding area 
for prisoners awaiting shipment to the main prisoner of war facility located at Camp 
Bucca near the Kuwait border.150       
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Although the high outer wall separated the sixty-acre prison compound from the 
small Iraq town of Abu Ghraib, anti-U.S. sentiment ran high, so small arms fire, mortar, 
and rocket attacks were commonplace.151  According to Karpinski, it was not a favorable 
location for a prison: 
[While] prisoners are ideally held in safe areas, far behind the lines, Abu 
Ghraib, by contrast, sat in a hot zone, along a dangerous road between 
Baghdad and the rebellious Sunni Triangle.152   
In July 2003, U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer toured Abu Ghraib and consented to 
its use on an interim basis until a newer facility could be constructed.153  A major effort 
was launched to reclaim eight crumbling cellblocks, restoring and modernizing them to 
corrections-system standards.  Ultimately, two of the renovated cellblocks would be 
named 1A and 1B, and once taken over by the military intelligence, would become the 
site of torture and human degradation.154   
B. THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 
The 800th Military Police Brigade was normally manned by 1,,,,,,,,700 reserve soldiers 
from a two-state region, but at the time of their January 2003 deployment, manpower 
shortages required the unit to be patched together from separate reserve units mobilized 
from New York, Maryland, Indiana, and Georgia.155  As a result, fewer than 500 soldiers 
of the brigade had ever worked together; even less had ever performed correctional 
duties.156  According to Karpinski: 
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Most of the MP’s had some basic training in police duties, including the 
brigade’s mission of running Iraqi prisoner-of-war camps.  Exactly how 
well they were trained and how well they would work together was 
impossible to say.157   
Post incident, the Taguba Report would note that “the 800th MP units did not receive 
Internment/Resettlement and corrections specific training during their mobilization 
period.”158 
The 372nd Military Police (MP) Company, originally from Maryland, were the 
main perpetrators of the prisoner abuse.159  They had deployed to Iraq in April 2003, 
despite numerous disciplinary problems.160  For example, Specialist Charles Graner, one 
of the ringleaders of the abuse, had been cross-trained from military policeman to vehicle 
mechanic because of allegations of spousal abuse.  Nevertheless, because he worked in a 
civilian prison, he was brought to the 372nd because they badly needed his corrections 
expertise.161  Interestingly, Graner and his mistress, Private Lynndie England, who was 
also caught abusing prisoners, were involved in a precursory incident before their 
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Karpinski notes: 
During a night out in Virginia Beach before they deployed, the couple 
played a trick on a drunken soldier who had passed out.  England posed 
nude with the man while Graner took pictures, an eerie hint of behavior to 
come.162     
C. PRECURSORS CONTRIBUTING TO AN ABUSIVE ENVIRONMENT 
Within a month after the new cellblocks were opened, the 205 Military 
Intelligence Brigade took over 1A and 1B to use them for interrogating security 
detainees.  Security detainees are prisoners held for their potential intelligence value.  
Strangely, General Karpinski agreed to military intelligence’s (MI’s) exclusive use of the 
two recently renovated cellblocks, with an arrangement that left her MP’s in-place to 
feed, account for, and sign out detainees to MI interrogators.  The result of this 
arrangement was a confusing and somewhat dysfunctional corrections facility system of 
oversight where Iraqi prisons personnel controlled the physical infrastructure, MP’s were 
responsible for guarding the prisoners, and MI controlled the more sensitive detainees.163  
This arrangement would become further complicated when Combined Joint Task Force 
Seven (CJTF-7) Commander, Lieutenant General Richardo Sanchez, ordered the 205 MI 
Brigade to take tactical control of all Abu Ghraib.  Subsequently, the chain of command 
became murky and no memoranda of agreement were developed to clarify 
responsibilities.164   
 By the fall of 2003, Abu Ghraib’s population had grown to several thousand 
detainees.  Major General Geoffrey Miller, commander of the terrorist detention center at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was sent to Abu Ghraib to review MI procedures, to assess 
detention operations, and to make suggestions for acquiring more actionable 
intelligence.165  Ultimately, Miller would recommend much harsher methods for prisoner 
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Although the high outer wall separated the sixty-acre prison compound from the 
small Iraq town of Abu Ghraib, anti-U.S. sentiment ran high, so small arms fire, mortar, 
and rocket attacks were commonplace.151  According to Karpinski, it was not a favorable 
location for a prison: 
[While] prisoners are ideally held in safe areas, far behind the lines, Abu 
Ghraib, by contrast, sat in a hot zone, along a dangerous road between 
Baghdad and the rebellious Sunni Triangle.152   
In July 2003, U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer toured Abu Ghraib and consented to 
its use on an interim basis until a newer facility could be constructed.153  A major effort 
was launched to reclaim eight crumbling cellblocks, restoring and modernizing them to 
corrections-system standards.  Ultimately, two of the renovated cellblocks would be 
named 1A and 1B, and once taken over by the military intelligence, would become the 
site of torture and human degradation.154   
B. THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 
The 800th Military Police Brigade was normally manned by 1,700 reserve soldiers 
from a two-state region, but at the time of their January 2003 deployment, manpower 
shortages required the unit to be patched together from separate reserve units mobilized 
from New York, Maryland, Indiana, and Georgia.155  As a result, fewer than 500 soldiers 
of the brigade had ever worked together; even less had ever performed correctional 
duties.156  According to Karpinski: 
 
 
                                                 
151 Karpinski, One Woman’s Army, 32-33.  
152 Ibid.   
153 Ibid., 32-35. 
154 Ibid., 34-35.   
155 GlobalSecurity.org,  “800th Military Police Brigade (EPW) (USAR),” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/800mp-bde.htm (accessed November 3, 2007), and  
“Karpinski, One Woman’s Army, 149. 
156 Ibid. 
 51
“sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses on several detainees.”171   According to the 
Taguba Report, MG Anthony Taguba’s informal investigation into the 800th MP 
Brigade’s detention and interment operations, these acts were “substantiated by detailed 
witness statements and extremely graphic photographic evidence.”172  These acts of 
abuse included:  
Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet; 
videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; forcibly 
arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for 
photographing; forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping 
them naked for several days at a time; forcing naked male detainees to 
wear women’s underwear; forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate 
while being photographed and videotaped; arranging naked male detainees 
in a pile and then jumping on them; positioning a naked detainee on a 
MRE box with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, 
toes, and penis to simulate electric torture; writing ‘I am a rapist’ on the 
leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow 
detainee and then photographing him naked; placing a dog chain or strap 
around a naked detainee’s neck and having a female soldier pose for a 
picture; a male MP guard having sex with a female detainee; using 
military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten 
detainees, and in at least one case, biting and severely injuring a detainee; 
and taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.173 
Other allegations of abuse from detainee witnesses that were deemed credible included: 
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; 
threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol; pouring cold water on 
naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; 
threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to 
stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed 
against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light 
and perhaps a broomstick; using military working dogs to frighten and 
intimidate detainees with threats of attack; and in one instance, actually 
biting a detainee.174 
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E. THE UNCOVERING 
Sometime in December 2003, Specialist Joseph Darby, a fellow MP assigned to 
the 372nd, entered cellblock 1A to drop off some paperwork, and observed several naked 
detainees that he would later comment “gave him a bad feeling.”175  Darby had been 
given the task of putting together a photographic record of the company’s deployment, 
and subsequently had asked Graner for pictures.  As he reviewed the photos on a diskette 
Graner gave him, Darby came across the startling photos.176  Ultimately, the photos 
would prompt Darby to give Criminal Investigation Division (CID) officials a copy on 
January 13, 2004.177   
F. SLOW ROLL OR COVER-UP? 
The CID officials who saw the photos the next day did not immediately 
recommend they be shown to senior officials in the chain of command.  Nevertheless, 
over the next couple of days, military leadership from CJTF-7 and CENTCOM were 
informed of their existence and the allegations of abuse.  On January 16, 2004, a brief 
CENTCOM press release announced that an investigation had been opened to look into 
reported incidents of detainee abuse at an undisclosed detention facility.178   
By March 2004, CJTF-7 and CENTCOM leaders were provided with an interim 
report of investigation, but they did not send the photos to more senior officials.  
Lieutenant General Sanchez would later tell the Schlesinger Panel that: 
He did not request the photos be disseminated beyond the criminal 
investigative process because commanders are prohibited from interfering 
with, or influencing, active investigations.179   
By April, the report of investigation had made it through Army channels but had not 
made its way to the Secretary of Defense.180  Subsequently, when Chairman of the Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, learned of CBS news’ planned release of the 
photos, sometime in April 2004, he was caught completely by surprise.  Myers feared 
that the planned release of the photos might further endanger the lives of coalition forces 
who were engaged in the fierce fighting in progress in the Iraqi cities of Fallujah and 
Najaf.181  Subsequently, he was able to convince CBS news to delay the release of the 
photos because the story of abuse had already been made public in the January 
CENTCOM news release.182  At the same time, Seymour Hersh learned of the existence 
of the photos from the producers of 60 Minutes II, the CBS news show.  His publisher, 
The New Yorker, decided to publish immediately, as they were reasonably confident of 
the accuracy of the story.  This, in turn, caused CBS to put pressure on the Pentagon to 
cooperate with the report, as release of the photos by the press was inevitable within the 
next couple of days.  Ultimately, the Pentagon conceded.   
On April 28, 2004, Dan Rather announced the existence of the photos on the CBS 
Evening News.  On April 30th, Hersh’s story of Abu Ghraib, complete with photos, was 
placed on The New Yorker website.  Hersh wrote three stories over the next three weeks, 
with every major newspaper in the U.S. relying heavily on his work for follow-up 
reporting.183 
G. THE INVESTIGATIONS 
There were a number of key investigations into the allegations of abuse at Abu 
Ghraib.  In addition to the criminal case opened by CID as a result of Specialist Darby’s 
exposure of the photographs, on January 19, 2004, CJTF-7 Commander, Lieutenant 
General Sanchez requested that the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
appoint an investigating officer, Major General or higher, to evaluate the detention and 
internment operations conducted by the 800th MP Brigade from November 2003 to 
January 2004.  On January 24, 2004, CENTCOM directed the Commander, Coalition 
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Lieutenant General David McKiernan to 
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conduct the investigation.  McKiernan, in turn, directed Major General Antonio M. 
Taguba to conduct a full investigation into the circumstances surrounding the allegations 
of detainee abuse, detainee escapes, and accountability lapses, as well as an overall 
assessment of the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.184  In March 2004, 
the Taguba Report was published.  Taguba found: 
[A pattern] of systemic and illegal abuse of detainees, intentionally 
perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd 
MP Company, 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade) in Tier 1A of the 
Abu Ghraib Prison.185   
He also concluded that Brigadier General Karpinski, 800th MP Brigade Commander, had 
“not properly trained or monitored her troops and had allowed lax discipline.”186  Taguba 
would go on to recommend that Karpinski and seven MP officers and enlisted soldiers be 
relieved of command or duty and receive formal reprimands.187  The Taguba report was 
the first investigatory report on Abu Ghraib.  It was routed through Department of Army 
channels and somehow leaked to Seymour Hersh in April 2004.  The report became a key 
source of information for Hersh’s stories, providing much of the information about the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib that we know about today.   It also served as the baseline for a 
series of corrective actions that the Army would take to correct problems of abuse 
theater-wide.     
 The Taguba report was followed by the Mikolashek Report in July 2004.  The 
Mikolashek Report was the official record of an assessment of detainee operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, conducted by the Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) 
and released in July 2004.  The Army IG found that:  
The overwhelming majority of our leaders and soldiers understood the 
requirement to treat detainees humanely and were doing so; these 
incidents of abuse resulted from the failure of individuals to follow known 
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standards of discipline and Army Values and, in some cases, the failure of 
a few leaders to enforce those standards of value.188  
The Department of Defense (DoD) also formed an independent panel to review 
DoD detainee operations and specifically the 300 incidents of alleged detainee abuse 
across the Joint Operations Areas of Iraq and Afghanistan.189  The panel concluded that 
the abuses at Abu Ghraib:  
Would have been avoided with proper training, leadership, and oversight.  
[Subsequently,] those [abuses] in cell block 1 had a unique nature, 
fostered by the predilections of the non-commissioned officers in 
charge…190   
The panel also determined that:  
The impact of Abu Ghraib was magnified by the fact that the shocking 
photographs were aired throughout the world in April 2004.  
Consequently, the highest levels of command and leadership in the DoD 
were not adequately informed nor prepared to respond to the Congress and 
the American public when copies were released by the press.191    
Also worthy of mention is the Fay-Jones Report, released in August 2004.  This 
report was generated by Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones and Major General George 
R. Fay.  General Fay’s orders were to determine whether the members of the 205th MI 
Battalion had “requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited” the MP’s at Abu Ghraib to 
abuse detainees as well as whether MI personnel had followed the rules for proper 
interrogation procedures.192  General Fay concluded that in several instances, MI 
personnel did solicit the MP abuse and did participate directly in the abuse.  He also 
found that MI did not follow the rules and regulations for detainee interrogations.  
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Finally, he determined that leaders at Abu Ghraib did not properly supervise interrogation 
operations and failed to take action when allegations of abuse were reported.193  
General Jones was directed to determine whether personnel higher in the chain of 
command than the 205th MI Brigade had played a role in the detainee abuse at the 
prison.194  Jones found that some of the incidents at Abu Ghraib were the result of 
intentional acts committed with the intent to:  
Cause bodily harm using unlawful force as well as sexual offenses 
including, but not limited to rape, sodomy, and indecent assault; [while 
others] were actions taken based on misinterpretations of or confusion 
about law or policy.195 
Nevertheless, he reported that “the chain of command directly above the 205th MI 
Brigade was not directly involved in the abuses at Abu Ghraib.”196   
H. THE “BAD APPLES” AND THEIR PUNISHMENTS 
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was the highest ranking officer punished in 
light of the abuses at Abu Ghraib.  She was formally relieved from command of the 800th 
MP Brigade, received a letter of reprimand, and ultimately had her promotion to 
Brigadier General vacated by President Bush, which effectively demoted her to Colonel.  
She officially retired in 2005.197  Colonel Thomas Pappas, Commander of the 205th MI 
Brigade, was also relieved of command, given a letter of reprimand for dereliction of 
duty, and fined $8,000.198  Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, Commander of the 320th 
MI Brigade, was removed from the promotion list and subsequently retired.199  Staff 
Sergeant Ivan Frederick, the night shift supervisor, was court-martialed, reduced in rank 
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to private, ordered to forfeit all pay and allowances, was sentenced to eight and a half 
years prison time; he will receive a dishonorable discharge upon completion of his 
sentence.200  Sergeant Javal Davis was court-martialed, reduced in rank, and received a 
six month prison sentence.  He received a bad-conduct discharge upon completion of his 
prison sentence.201  Corporal Charles Graner was court-martialed, reduced in rank to 
private, sentenced to ten years prison time; he will be dishonorably discharged from the 
Army upon completion of his sentence.202  Specialist Jeremy Sivits was court-martialed, 
reduced in rank, sentenced to one year in prison, and received a bad-conduct discharge 
upon completion of his sentence.203  Specialist Sabrina Harman was court-martialed, 
sentenced to six months imprisonment, and given a bad-conduct discharge upon 
completion of her sentence.204  Specialist Megan Ambuhl was reduced in rank to private, 
lost half a month’s pay, and was discharged from the Army without serving prison 
time.205  Specialist Armin Cruz was court-martialed, reduced in rank to private, 
sentenced to eight months in prison, and received a bad conduct discharge upon 
completion of his prison sentence.206  Specialist Roman Krol was court-martialed, 
reduced in rank to private, sentenced to ten months in prison, and received a bad conduct 
discharge upon completion of his sentence.207  Finally, Private First Class Lynndie 
England was court-martialed, sentenced to three years imprisonment; she will receive a 
dishonorable discharge upon completion of her sentence.208    
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I. MEDIA PRIMING AND INITIAL PUBLIC RESPONSE 
America’s response to the release of the Abu Ghraib photos can best be described 
as “outright anger, humiliation, and shame.”209  Americans were offended and even 
angry about the photos.210  Not surprisingly, some conservative hawks argued that the 
media was making too much of the photographs, endangering the lives of Americans 
serving overseas, while liberal doves demanded the resignation of Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld and a full accounting of what happened.211  In general though, Americans 
followed the story pretty closely, not liking what they saw.  Ultimately, they would 
conclude that the incidents were isolated, not indicative of the military as a whole.  
Unlike My Lai, this time America wanted the offenders punished.  The public would hold 
the soldiers mostly responsible but were critical of President Bush and Secretary 
Rumsfeld as well.212  Public outrage over the photos might have been more intense had it 
not been for the government’s efforts to prevent the release of the remaining photos for 
their graphic and inflammatory contents.   
Although not unanimously supported by both parties in Congress, efforts to 
suppress the release of additional photos were eventually successful.  It was argued that 
the photos might further endanger U.S. servicemen and servicewomen serving in the 
Middle East.213  After Congress saw a presentation containing eight hundred Abu Ghraib 
abuse photos, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner, one of the 
White House’s early antagonists over the Abu Ghraib affair, concluded that “the pictures 
should not be made public.  ‘I feel that they could possibly endanger the men and women 
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of the armed forces as they are serving and at great risk.’”214  DoD officials offered two 
additional reasons for withholding additional images of abuse.  Specifically, they argued 
that the photos amounted to an “unwarranted invasions of privacy and [that they could 
have a] potential impact on law enforcement efforts [because they could deprive the 
accused of a fair trial.]”215  Critics would offer two additional explanations for the 
successful suppression of additional Abu Ghraib images.  First was a desire to protect a 
classified special access program or SAP, directed at generating human intelligence or 
HUMINT about the insurgency in Iraq.  Hersh reported that the SAP actually encouraged 
the use of physical coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners with the intent of 
producing actionable intelligence.216  Subsequently, knowledge of the SAP may have 
been what convinced Senator John Warner to conclude his probing into the matter.217  
Second was the obvious political impact of the scandal during an election year.  There is 
some evidence to suggest that pressure was put on the Department of the Army to have 
all Abu Ghraib investigations completed by August of 2004, before the Republican 
National Convention, for fear of its impact on the president’s re-election potential.218   
Whether the result of a single reason or a combination of the above mentioned 
arguments, efforts to stop the further release of photographs have so far been successful.    
The CBS news show, 60 Minutes II, had originally televised four of the photos 
during its first Abu Ghraib broadcast on April 28, 2004.219  The New Yorker followed this 
report, publishing approximately ten more photos on May 4, 2004.220  Other news media 
outlets, including ABC News and The Washington Post, published additional photos 
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throughout the month of May 2004 and one in June.221  After that, publication of the 
photos consisted primarily of recycled images until the American Civil Liberties Union 
pressed the issue in federal court, ultimately winning the release of eighty-seven more 
photographs and four videos.222  By then, the impact of the story had mostly subsided, 
and the attention of the American public had moved on to other matters.  
J. ELITE INFLUENCE 
 Certainly there was ample elite rhetoric about the shocking revelation of the 
photos.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Richard Myers testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in early 
May 2004, following the initial release of the story.  Rumsfeld’s opening statement, 
recorded by the Federal News Service, included the following comments: 
It is important for the American people and the world to know that while 
these terrible acts were perpetrated by a small number of U.S. military, 
they were also brought to light by the honorable and responsible actions of 
other military personnel.  There are many who did their duty 
professionally…223 
Similarly, General Myers remarked:  
One of our greatest strengths comes from the fact that we hold our 
servicemen and women accountable for their actions…  I have complete 
confidence in our military justice system.  The accused will receive due 
process.  Those found guilty will receive punishments based on their 
offenses.224   
Identical comments about the abuse being limited to a few “bad apples,” along with 
apologies to the Arab World and American people, were made by Secretary of State 
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Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, White House Press Secretary 
Scott McClellan, and senior DoD officials throughout the month of May 2004.225   
President Bush reacted to the story of abuse by condemning the maltreatment of 
Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers.  He appeared on Arab television shortly after the Abu 
Ghraib story broke in an attempt to limit the impact of the photographs and to convince 
the Arab people that the mistreatment was not representative of America as a whole.226  
Immediately, critics in the Arab world, the international community, the press, and 
Congress accused the president of not offering a direct apology, so on May 7, 2004, in 
the White House Rose Garden, Bush expressed his regrets and offered a formal apology 
to visiting King Abdullah II of Jordan, who seemed to be symbolically representing the 
Arab people.227  However, it was not until late May 2004, that the president formally 
addressed the American people about the Abu Ghraib scandal.  Addressing the nation on 
24 May, President Bush called for demolishing the Abu Ghraib prison. He remarked:  
A new Iraq will need a humane, well-supervised prison system.  Under the 
dictator, prisons like Abu Ghraib were symbols of death and torture.  That 
same prison became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American 
troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values.  America 
will fund the construction of a modern, maximum security prison.  When 
that prison is completed, detainees at Abu Ghraib will be relocated.  Then, 
with the approval of the Iraqi government, we will demolish the Abu 
Ghraib prison, as a fitting symbol of Iraq’s new beginning.228  
Many critics picked up on the Bush Administration’s united position on the abuse being 
perpetrated by a “few bad apples.”  Some argue that this was done to take pressure off the 
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administration for its policies on torture that may have ultimately contributed to the 
conditions that led to the abuse.229  Although not lost on the American people, this belief 
does not seem to have taken hold as support for the president and the war fell during this 
period, but revived after a short time.    
K. THE ABU GHRAIB POLLS 
 The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press specifically asked several 
questions about Abu Ghraib in its May 2004 Political/Believability Survey.  Two of these 
questions are especially useful.  They are: 
1) How much, if anything have you heard about reports of mistreatment of 
Iraqi prisoners by U.S. troops…a lot, a little, or nothing at all?  2) Did you 
happen to see any of the pictures on which the reports of mistreatment are 
based or not?230   
Pew found that 58 percent of those polled had heard a lot about the story, while 34 
percent had heard a little and only 8 percent reported not hearing anything.231  Of those 
polled, 76 percent of Americans reported that they had seen the pictures, while only 24 
percent had not.232  Pew’s polling data suggests that the Abu Ghraib prison abuse story 
and pictures did capture the attention of Americans, having received quite a bit of media 
exposure within the first few days of their release.  Pew later reported that the Abu 
Ghraib scandal was the twelfth most closely followed news story of 2004.233  This is also 
consistent with Pew’s other findings on the percentage of Americans paying attention to 
the news about Iraq during 2004.  In a December 2004 report, Pew’s analysts reported 
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that news about Iraq “ranked second only to news about high gasoline prices in terms of 
the year’s most closely followed stories.”234  Moreover, Pew’s December analysis shows 
that the percentage of Americans following the news in Iraq spiked, beginning at 47 
percent in March 2004 and traveling to the highest point for the year to 54 percent by 
April, before declining throughout the month of May, and reaching a low of 39 percent 
by June.235  This increased attention in April is probably due to the heavy fighting by 
U.S. troops in Fallujah and the subsequent heavy American casualty rate suffered during 
this period.  Conversely, the truce between the U.S. forces and the Al-Sadr militia in 
Najaf after seven weeks of fighting, as well as preparations for the transfer of sovereignty 
in June, may have marked a beginning of the loss of interest by the American public.236  
Other available data would seem to support this as Pew analysts recorded a ten percent 
increase in Americans becoming less emotionally involved in the war from May to 
August 2004.237   
 During this same period, Gallup asked a similar question about how closely 
Americans were following the story of abuse of Iraqi prisoners.  Specifically, Gallup 
asked: 
How closely have you been following the news about evidence of U.S. 
soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners, including incidents that involve 
photographs of the abuse—very closely, somewhat closely, not too 
closely, or not at all?238   
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Of the 1003 Americans Gallup polled, 41 percent had been following the news very 
closely, 39 percent somewhat closely, 15 percent not too closely, and 5 percent not 
closely at all.239  Interestingly, when the first two categories of the Gallup data are 
combined, we find that a total of 80 percent of Americans were following the story fairly 
closely.   
During the same poll, Gallup asked, “Would you say the abuse of Iraqi prisoners 
by U.S. soldiers bothers you—a great deal, a fair amount, not much, or not at all?”240  Of 
the random sample of 1003 Americans, 54 percent said the abuse bothered them a great 
deal, 25 percent said it bothered them a fair amount, 11 percent said it bothered them not 
much, and 9 percent said it did not bother them at all.241   Gallup asked the same question 
roughly a year later, with 39 percent reporting being bothered a great deal by the abuse, 
24 percent a fair amount, 17 percent not much, and 19 percent not at all.242  Although the 
percentage of Americans who were bothered by the abuse dropped as almost a year 
transpired, we see that a solid majority of more than 60 percent of Americans was still 
bothered by the stories of abuse, even a year later.  The conclusions we can draw from 
the Pew and Gallup polling during this timeframe are: 1) Americans were closely 
following the Iraq War during this timeframe; 2) A significant number of Americans 
were aware of the abuse photographs and followed the Abu Ghraib scandal in the news 
during this period; and 3) A substantial majority of Americans were bothered quite a bit 
by the stories of abuse even a year later.     
L. OPTIONS FOR EXAMINING PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT FOR IRAQ 
 Fortunately, for the Abu Ghraib case study, there are several good public opinion 
polling questions designed to measure generalized war support from two credible polling 
sources.  These questions were asked with greater frequency, so analysis, though still 
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complicated, can be accomplished with greater confidence than in the My Lai case, 
because the reference points are more numerous, and the data can be cross-referenced 
against other sources.  Certainly it would have been better if the polling organizations had 
asked a question directly about how the Abu Ghraib incident affected the respondent’s 
support for the Iraq War.  Unfortunately, no polling organization asked that question, so I 
was left with the more general questions regarding war support.   
For the purposes of consistency, the Iraq War “mistake question” is included in 
this analysis as well as several other relevant questions.  Questions to be analyzed 
include: 1) Gallup’s “mistake question”—“In view of the developments since we first 
sent our troops to Iraq, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops 
to Iraq or not?”243  2) Pew’s “right/wrong decision question”—“Do you think the U.S. 
made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq?”244  3) 
Gallup’s “worth it question”—“All in all, do you think it was worth going to war in Iraq, 
or not?”245  These questions were chosen for their generalized nature, which is best suited 
to help us understand how Abu Ghraib affected the overall support for the Iraq War.    
 As Mueller noted, the most interesting thing about the Iraq War is how quickly 
the support evaporated.246  According to the data available for the “mistake question,” 
support fell below 50 percent for the first time in June 2004.247  Although not a large 
shift in public opinion, with 44 percent continuing to support the war and only 54 percent 
against it,248 it is interesting that this shift occurred during the timeframe right after Abu 
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Ghraib, the intense fighting in Najaf, and the on-going and sometimes very bloody 
fighting in Fallujah, and just before the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis.   
 For the Abu Ghraib case study, I was particularly interested in the period of time 
from the end of April 2004 through May 2004, at the height of media reporting on the 
story.  I decided not to attempt to track the effect of the individual trials of the “bad 
apples” as there were simply too many of them spread over a long period.  Also, although 
Corporal Charles Graner appears to have been the central figure in the abuse scandal, his 
role as the main perpetrator does not appear to have caught hold with the public as it did 
for Lieutenant William Calley.    
M. THE GALLUP “MISTAKE QUESTION” 
Gallup asked its “mistake question” for the Iraq War with greater frequency and 
consistency than it did for Vietnam.  Moreover, a cross-check of several sources 
reporting Gallup’s data revealed no obvious conflicts or discrepancies like those 
appearing for the Vietnam era.  The lack of such problems as well as the ease of detecting 
the more obvious changes in the support for the war during the initial release period of 
the Abu Ghraib story make it reasonable to work with whole numbers, as there was no 
need to go two places beyond the decimal point to interpret the data.  Also convenient for 
this particular case study is the fact that Gallup conducted polling on April 16-18, 2004, 
just before the Abu Ghraib news release on April 28th, and then again on May 7-9, at the 
height of reporting on the incident.  The results of the Gallup “mistake question” for the 
Abu Ghraib period are included in Table 3-1 below.  The results of the Gallup “mistake 
question” polling for the entire Iraq War to date are located at the end of the chapter.  
Once again, those answering “yes” to the “mistake question” were placed in the 
opposition column while those answering “no” were placed in the support column.   
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Date # Days Between Support Oppose Unsure % Change in Support Rate of Decline
3-5 Nov 03 28 60 39 1 1 1.0714
12-15 Jan 04 70 56 42 2 -4 -1.7143
16-18 Apr 04 95 57 42 1 1 0.3158
7-9 May 04 21 54 44 2 -3 -4.2857
3-6 Jun 04 27 58 41 1 4 4.4444
21-23 Jun 04 18 44 54 2 -14 -23.3333
8-11 Jul 04 17 45 54 1 1 1.7647
19-21 Jul 04 11 47 50 3 2 5.4545
30 Jul-1 Aug 04 11 51 47 2 4 10.9091
Entire War 1565 -39 -0.7476
Before Abu Ghraib 389 -18 -1.3882
Abu Ghraib 21 -3 -4.2857
After Abu Ghraib 1155 -18 -0.4675  
Table 3-1. Summary of Gallup “Mistake Question” Iraq.249 
 
For the April 16-18 poll, 1003 Americans were asked the “mistake question,” with 42 
percent responding that the U.S. had made a mistake (indicating opposition for the war), 
and 57 percent responding that the U.S. had not (indicating support for the war); only 1 
percent were unsure.250  In the May 7-9, poll, 44 percent responded that the U.S. made a 
mistake, 54 percent responded that the U.S. had not, and 2 percent were unsure.251  The 
difference between the two polling points is a drop in support of approximately 3 percent.  
(Gallup reported no lost code or data for this polling period.)  While not a big drop in 
support, and still within the plus or minus 3 percent margin of error, the change appears 
to be significant, considering the average presidential rally is generally an increase in 
approval of between 3 to 6 percentage points.  By using Gallup’s polling data on the 
“mistake question” to calculate the average drop in support per month over the course of 
the war, we find that the average is a .75% drop in support per month for this particular 
polling question.  When compared to the 3 percent drop in support during the Abu Ghraib 
timeframe, the change in support starts to look much more significant because it is more 
than four times the average drop in support per month over the course of the war.   
Nevertheless, this effect was extremely short-lived as indicated by the June 3-6 Gallup 
poll where 41 percent responded that the U.S. had made a mistake, 58 percent reported 
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that the U.S. had not, and 1 percent were unsure.252  Thus by June, support had 
rebounded approximately 4 percentage points.  The scholarly research on rallies generally 
concludes that they normally last for short periods of time (between one to three months).  
It is interesting that the negative impact of Abu Ghraib would affect public opinion for a 
similar amount of time—approximately one month.  We will further refine this effect 
period when we analyze the additional polling data for the Gallup “worth it question.”   
Also important to mention here is the possibility that President Bush interrupted 
the negative consequence period for Abu Ghraib when he held his “Steps to Help Iraq 
Achieve Democracy and Freedom” speech on the night of May 24, 2004.253  His speech 
may have prompted a mini-rally that helped bring public opinion out of its Abu Ghraib 
doldrums and returned it to an almost normal course for the war.  The ABC News and 
The Washington Post polls on April 15-18, May 20-23, and June 17-20, would seem to 
support this conclusion.  Specifically, ABC News and The Washington Post asked the 
public “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling the situation in 
Iraq?”254  Bush’s approval was at 45 percent in April, fell to 40 percent by May, and then 
returned to 44 percent by June.255  Interestingly, Pew also asked this question April 21-25 
but not again until June 3-13.  The results conflict with the ABC News and The 
Washington Post polls, as Pew’s data reveals a drop in approval from 44 percent in April 
to 42 percent in June.256  Of course the problem with this question is that one can support 
the war in general but not how the president is handling it.  Nevertheless, the ABC News 
and The Washington Post polling seems to indicate a rally during this period.   
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N. THE PEW “RIGHT/WRONG QUESTION” 
Moving to Pew’s question “Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the 
wrong decision in using military force against Iraq,”257 we find a similar effect on public 
opinion support during the late April 2004 to early June 2004 Abu Ghraib timeframe.  
Those answering that the U.S. made the “right” decision were added to the support 
column while those answering the U.S. made the “wrong” decision were placed in the 
opposition column.  The results for the Abu Ghraib period are included in Table 3.2 
below.  The results of the Pew “right/wrong” question for the entire period of the Iraq 
War are included in a table located at the end of the chapter.   
 
Date # Days Between Support Oppose Unsure % Change in Support Rate of Decline
Jan 6-11/04 18 65 30 5 3 5
Feb 11-16/04 36 56 39 5 -9 -7.5
Feb 24-29/04 13 60 32 8 4 9.2308
Mar 17-21/04 22 55 39 6 -5 -6.8182
Apr 1-4/04 15 57 35 8 2 4
Apr 21-25/04 20 54 37 9 -3 -4.5
May 3-9/04 12 51 42 7 -3 -7.5
Jun 3-13/04 31 55 38 7 4 3.871
Jul 8-18/04 35 52 43 5 -3 -2.5714
Aug 5-10/04 28 53 41 6 1 1.0714
Sep 8-13/04 34 53 39 8 0 0
Oct 1-3/04 23 50 39 11 -3 -3.913
Entire War 1490 -26 -0.5235
Before 398 -17 -1.2814
Abu Ghraib 12 -3 -7.5
After 1080 -6 -0.1667  
Table 3-2. Summary of Pew “Right/Wrong Question” Iraq.258 
 
Pew’s choice of polling time periods for asking this question are almost as good as 
Gallup’s.  Pew conducted polls on April 21-25, May 3-9, and June 3-13, 2004.  Of the 
1508 adults polled in April, 54 percent thought the U.S. made the right decision to use 
military force in Iraq, 37 percent thought the U.S. made the wrong decision, and 9 
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percent said they were unsure.259  By May, 51 percent said they thought the decision was 
right, 42 percent said they thought it was wrong, and 7 percent were unsure.260  In June, 
55 percent said it was the right decision, 38 percent said it was the wrong decision, and 7 
percent were undecided.261  Once again, the data shows a 3 percent drop in support from 
April to May, followed by a 4 percent rebound in June.  While still within the plus or 
minus 3 percent margin of error for the data`, the drop in support between the April and 
May 2004 polls led to the lowest level of support measured by Pew since the war 
began.262  The only difference with Pew’s polling is that support appears to have started 
to decline much earlier, as evidenced by the difference between the April 1-4 and April 
21-25 polls.  This may be an anomaly or public response to perceptions of success or 
failure over the intense fighting in Fallujah and Najaf.  Using all of Pew’s data (January 
2003-November 2005) for the right/wrong question, the average change in war support 
per month over the course of the war was .52%, or about half a percentage point decline 
per month.  Again, the change in support for the Abu Ghraib timeframe is significant as it 
is roughly six times greater than the average drop in support over the course of the war.    
O. THE GALLUP “WORTH IT” QUESTION 
The results for the Gallup “worth it or not” question appear much more powerful 
than the other two questions, but are similar because they reveal a drop in support during 
the timeframe in question followed by a recovery immediately afterwards.  Those 
answering that the war was “worth it” were placed in the support column and those 
answering that the war was “not worth it” were converted into the opposition column.   
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The results for the Abu Ghraib period are included in Table 3-3 below.  The results of the 
Gallup “worth it” question for the entire Iraq War are included in a table at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
Date # Days Between Support Opposition No Opinion % Change in Support Rate of Decline
Jan 9-11 2004 25 59 38 3 -6 -7.2
Jan 29-Feb 1 2004 20 49 49 2 -10 -15
Mar 5-7 2004 36 55 43 2 6 5
Mar 26-28 2004 21 56 41 3 1 1.4286
Apr 5-8 2004 10 50 47 3 -6 -18
Apr 16-18 2004 11 52 46 2 2 5.4545
May 2-4 2004 16 50 47 3 -2 -3.75
May 7-9 2004 5 44 54 2 -6 -36
May 21-23 2004 14 45 52 3 1 2.1429
Jun 3-6 2004 13 46 53 2 1 2.3077
Jun 21-23 2004 18 46 51 3 0 0
Jul 8-11 2004 17 47 50 3 1 1.7647
Aug 9-11 2004 32 49 47 3 2 1.875
Aug 23-25 2004 14 50 46 3 1 2.1429
Sep 3-5 2004 11 49 48 3 -1 -2.7273
Oct 9-10 2004 36 44 54 2 -5 -4.1667
Entire War 1043 -15 -0.4314
Before Abu Ghraib 469 -1 -0.064
Initial Release 16 -2 -3.75
2 May-7 May 04 5 -6 -36
7 May-21 May 04 14 1 2.1429
21 May-3 Jun 04 13 1 2.3077
After Abu Ghraib 526 -8 -0.4563  
Table 3-3. Summary of Gallup “Worth It Question” Iraq.263 
 
As of the April 16-18 poll, those polled saying it was worth going to war in Iraq were at 
52 percent, with 46 percent saying it was not, and 2 percent answering no opinion.264  By 
the May 2-4 poll, 50 percent said it was worth it, 47 percent said it was not, and 3 percent 
had no opinion.265  Roughly a week later, during the May 7-9 poll, support had dropped 
even further with 44 percent saying it was worth it, 54 percent saying it was not, and 2 
percent answering no opinion.266  But by the May 21-23 poll, support was gradually 
starting to return, with 45 percent saying it was worth it, 52 percent saying it was not, and 
3 percent had no opinion.267  Finally, in the June 3-6 poll, 46 percent said it was worth it, 
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52 percent said it was not, and 2 percent had no opinion.268  The data reveals that support 
dropped 2 percentage points between the April 16-18 poll and the May 2-4 poll then 
dropped more dramatically by 6 percentage points by the May 7-9 poll, before it began a 
slow recovery in the May 21-23 and June 3-6 polls.  Again, the change in those saying 
the war was worth it was one of the sharpest drops in support recorded by Gallup over the 
course of the war.269  Interestingly, the sharpest drop was between the May 2-4 and May 
7-9 polls.  This may be explained by the flurry of media activity as the story escalated 
during the first part of May and as President Bush appeared on Arab television on May 
6th270 to apologize for the abuse.   The total drop between the April 16-18 poll and the 
May 7-9 polls was 8 percent, the highest for any of the generalized questions used to 
measure war support.  The average drop in support for the “worth it question” was 
slightly below half of a percentage point at .43%.  Therefore, for this question, the drop in 
support was almost nineteen times more than the monthly average of loss in support over 
the course of the war.  Also notable is that the recovery started sometime between the 
May 7-9 and May 21-23 polls.  The obvious advantage of this particular polling question 
is that there is an additional reference point between late May and early June that we do 
not have with the other two questions.  Again, it is possible that Bush’s speech on May 
24th may have created the momentum needed to bring public opinion out of the Abu 
Ghraib slump.  Nevertheless, the pattern indicated here shows a decline in support 
gradually, then more abruptly, followed by a recovery, although in this instance the 
recovery takes longer.    
P. CONCLUSIONS 
 The advantage of having more polling questions available at regular frequencies 
was highly significant for the Abu Ghraib case study.  Multiple questions allow for a 
more accurate assessment of the effect of the incident.  Also advantageous is the fact that 
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this data comes from more than one polling source.  Put simply, for Abu Ghraib, one 
does not have to guess about what was going on.  There is enough good data available to 
draw conclusions about public opinion response to this issue with a reasonable degree of 
certainty.  The fact that the data all show a similar result also gives the case study more 
credence.   
 The three polling questions examined yielded similar but slightly different results. 
The Gallup “mistake question” and the Pew “right/wrong question” are indicative of a 3 
percent drop in support, while Gallup’s “worth it question” was more extreme, with an 8 
percent drop.   Nevertheless, both are useful for understanding Abu Ghraib because they 
reveal a decline in support immediately following the media’s release of the story, 
followed by a slow but steady climb back to a level close to the one just prior to the 
story’s release.  All things being equal, this is what should have happened for a negative 
incident like Abu Ghraib, given all that we know about public opinion support.  As 
Mueller pointed out: 
[For the Iraq War,] increases [in public opinion support], proved to be 
temporary, more bumps on the road than permanent changes in 
direction…the same is true for negative occurrences: as drop in support 
after the disclosure of abuses at Abu Ghraib was in time mostly 
reversed.271   
Therefore, the only difference in the data is in the extremity of the drop and in the length 
of time it took for support to recover, not in the overall pattern of support.  It is possible 
that some of this extremity between the 8 percent and the 3 percent is nothing more than 
the margin of error indicative of all public opinion polling.  Again, these polls all have a 
plus or minus 3 percent margin of error, so they are less than perfect, but they are 
nevertheless useful for this analysis of Abu Ghraib.  It is also possible that the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual question wording created a slightly different response 
among the different samples.  Nevertheless, again, this does not change the overall 
pattern the data reveal. 
 Of further importance was how the public responded to Abu Ghraib.  Unlike My 
Lai, the public wanted the responsible military members punished for their inappropriate 
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behavior.  Some of this may have had to do with the lack of a central figure that the 
public keyed on as the instigator of the atrocity.  Although the media focused somewhat 
on Corporal Charles Graner as the central figure, his role and appearance did not seem to 
resonate as much with the public as the innocent-looking Lieutenant William Calley.  
Also, Abu Ghraib may have created a different effect because of the shorter amount of 
time that transpired before the revelation of the incident.  Abu Ghraib hit the press within 
six months of occurrence, while twenty months elapsed before the public heard about My 
Lai.  Thus the story of inappropriate behavior was still fresh.  By the time My Lai had 
been revealed, many of the perpetrators were already out of the military, with the 
exception of Lieutenant Calley, who was delayed before separation.  Finally, there was 
never much of a question as to whether the photos were real or fake, or whether the 
perpetrators were innocent or guilty.  It appears that the public accepted that the photos 
were real, the accused were guilty, and that the military would take appropriate action to 
punish the accused.     
 In conclusion, it appears that Abu Ghraib did affect public opinion support for the 
war, at least in the short term, or as Mueller would say, as a “bump or wiggle” in the 
overall public opinion support line.  It did not have a lasting effect on support for the war, 
as support returned in less than a month’s time to a pattern indicative of larger opinion 
trends on the war.  Thus, it cannot be linked causally as effectively finishing off overall 
support for the Iraq War.  Rather, it is more likely that the support for Iraq War 
evaporated as a result of perceptions of success becoming more grim, in lieu of 
increasing casualties and as the war has dragged on.   Although it appears that the 
president was able to rally the public to bring it out of the doldrums of Abu Ghraib, even 







Date # Days Between Support Oppose Unsure % Change in Support Rate of Decline
24-25 Mar 03 0 75 23 2 0 0
7-9 Jul 03 105 72 27 1 -3 -0.8571
6-8 Oct 03 91 59 40 1 -13 -4.2857
3-5 Nov 03 28 60 39 1 1 1.0714
12-15 Jan 04 70 56 42 2 -4 -1.7143
16-18 Apr 04 95 57 42 1 1 0.3158
7-9 May 04 21 54 44 2 -3 -4.2857
3-6 Jun 04 27 58 41 1 4 4.4444
21-23 Jun 04 18 44 54 2 -14 -23.3333
8-11 Jul 04 17 45 54 1 1 1.7647
19-21 Jul 04 11 47 50 3 2 5.4545
30 Jul-1 Aug 04 11 51 47 2 4 10.9091
23-25 Aug 04 24 50 48 2 -1 -1.25
3-5 Sep 04 11 57 38 5 7 19.0909
24-26 Sep 04 21 55 42 3 -2 -2.8571
1-3 Oct 04 7 51 48 1 -4 -17.1429
9-10 Oct 04 8 53 46 1 2 7.5
14-16 Oct 04 5 52 47 1 -1 -6
22-24 Oct 04 8 51 47 2 -1 -3.75
29-31 Oct 04 7 52 44 4 1 4.2857
19-21 Nov 04 21 51 47 2 -1 -1.486
7-9 Jan 05 49 48 50 2 -3 -1.8367
14-16 Jan 05 7 47 52 1 -1 -4.2857
4-6 Feb 05 21 55 45 0 8 11.4286
25-27 Feb 05 21 51 47 2 -4 -5.7143
18-20 Mar 05 21 51 46 3 0 0
29 Apr-1May 05 42 48 49 3 -3 -2.1429
24-26 Jun 05 56 46 53 1 -2 -1.0714
22-24 Jul 05 28 53 46 1 7 7.5
5-7 Aug 05 14 44 54 2 -9 -19.2857
28-30 Aug 05 23 46 53 1 2 2.6087
8-11 Sep 05 11 46 53 1 0 0
16-18 Sep 05 8 39 59 2 -7 -26.25
21-23 Oct 05 35 49 49 2 10 8.5714
28-30 Oct 05 7 45 54 1 -4 -17.1429
11-13 Nov 05 14 45 54 1 0 0
16-18 Dec 05 35 46 52 2 1 0.8571
6-8 Jan 06 21 47 50 3 1 1.4286
20-22 Jan 06 14 46 51 3 -1 -2.1429
9-12 Feb 06 20 42 55 3 -4 -6
28 Feb-1 Mar 06 19 43 55 2 1 1.5789
10-12 Mar 06 10 42 57 1 -1 -3
7-9 Apr 06 28 42 57 1 0 0
9-11 Jun 06 63 46 51 2 4 1.9048
23-25 Jun 06 14 43 55 1 -3 -9.4286
21-23 Jul 06 28 41 56 2 -2 -2.1429
28-30 Jul 06 7 45 54 2 4 17.1429
15-17 Sep 06 49 49 49 2 4 2.449
6-8 Oct 06 21 40 56 4 -9 -12.8571
20-22 Oct 06 14 40 58 2 0 0
2-5 Nov 06 13 40 55 5 0 0
8-10 Dec 06 36 45 53 2 5 4.1667
5-7 Jan 07 28 41 57 2 -4 -4.2857
12-14 Jan 07 7 41 58 2 0 0
9-11 Feb 07 28 42 56 2 1 1.0714
2-4 Mar 07 21 39 59 2 -3 -4.2857
23-25 Mar 07 21 43 56 2 4 5.7143
13-15 Apr 07 21 41 57 2 -2 -2.8571
4-6 May 07 21 40 58 2 -1 -1.4286
1-3 Jun 07 28 40 56 4 0 0
6-8 Jul 07 35 36 62 2 -4 -3.4286
Entire War 1565 -39 -0.7476
Before Abu Ghraib 389 -18 -1.3882
Abu Ghraib 21 -3 -4.2857
After Abu Ghraib 1155 -18 -0.4675  
Table 3-4. Gallup “Mistake Question” Iraq.272 
                                                 
272 USA Today/Gallup Polls 3/24-25/2003 to 7/6-8/2007, MoE +/- 3, located at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq2.htm (accessed July 30, 2007). 
 76
 Date # Days Between Support Oppose Unsure % Change in Support Rate of Decline
Mar 20-22/03 0 71 22 7 0 0
Mar 23-24/03 3 74 21 5 3 30
Mar 25-27/03 2 74 21 5 0 0
Mar 28-Apr 1/03 3 69 25 6 -5 -50
Apr 2-7/03 5 72 20 8 3 18
Apr 8-9/03 6 74 19 7 2 10
Apr 10-16/03 2 74 19 7 0 0
Jun 20-2 Jul/03 71 67 24 9 -7 -2.9577
Jul 14-Aug 5/03 24 63 30 7 -4 -5
Sep 1/03 49 63 31 6 0 0
Oct 1/03 30 60 33 7 -3 -3
Dec 15-17/03 75 67 26 7 7 2.8
Dec 19-Jan 4/04 4 62 28 10 -5 -37.5
Jan 6-11/04 18 65 30 5 3 5
Feb 11-16/04 36 56 39 5 -9 -7.5
Feb 24-29/04 13 60 32 8 4 9.2308
Mar 17-21/04 22 55 39 6 -5 -6.8182
Apr 1-4/04 15 57 35 8 2 4
Apr 21-25/04 20 54 37 9 -3 -4.5
May 3-9/04 12 51 42 7 -3 -7.5
Jun 3-13/04 31 55 38 7 4 3.871
Jul 8-18/04 35 52 43 5 -3 -2.5714
Aug 5-10/04 28 53 41 6 1 1.0714
Sep 8-13/04 34 53 39 8 0 0
Oct 1-3/04 23 50 39 11 -3 -3.913
Oct 15-19/04 14 46 42 12 -4 -8.5714
Oct 27-30/04 12 48 41 11 2 5
Dec 1-16/04 35 49 44 7 1 0.8571
Jan 5-9/05 35 51 44 5 2 1.7143
Feb 16-21/05 42 47 47 6 -4 -2.8571
Jun 8-12/05 112 47 45 8 0 0
Jul 13-17/05 35 49 44 7 2 1.7143
Sep 8-11/05 57 49 44 7 0 0
Oc 6-10/05 28 44 50 6 -5 -5.3571
Dec 7-11/05 62 47 48 5 3 1.4516
Jan 4-8/06 28 45 47 8 -2 -2.1429
Feb 1-5/06 28 51 44 5 6 6.4286
Mar 8-12/06 35 45 49 6 -6 -5.1429
Apr 7-16 30 47 46 7 2 2
Jun 14-19/06 68 49 44 7 2 0.8824
Sep 21-Oct 4/06 99 45 47 8 -4 -1.2121
Oct 17-22/06 26 43 47 10 -2 -2.3077
Nov 9-12/06 23 41 51 8 -2 -2.6087
Dec 6-10/06 27 42 51 7 1 1.1111
Jan 10-15/07 35 40 51 9 -2 -1.7143
Feb 7-11/07 28 40 54 6 0 0
Mar 21-25/07 42 43 49 8 3 2.1429
Apr 18-22/07 28 45 47 8 2 2.1429
Entire War 1490 -26 -0.5235
Before 398 -17 -1.2814
Abu Ghraib 12 -3 -7.5
After 1080 -6 -0.1667  
Table 3-5. Pew “Right/Wrong Question” Iraq.273 
                                                 
273 Pew Research Center For People & The Press Surveys Conducted by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International, 3/20-22/2003 to 4/18-22/2007, MoE +/- 3, located at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq4.htm (accessed July 30, 2007). 
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Date # Days Between Support Opposition No Opinion % Change in Support Rate of Decline
Jan 3-5 2003 0 53 42 5 0 0
Mar 24-25 2003 80 68 29 3 15 5.625
Apr 7-8 2003 14 67 30 3 -1 -2.1429
Apr 9 2003 2 76 19 5 9 135
Apr 14-16 2003 5 73 23 4 -3 -18
Jun 27-29 2003 74 56 42 2 -17 -6.8919
Jul 18-20 2003 21 63 35 2 7 10
Jul 25-27 2003 7 63 34 3 0 0
Aug 25-26 2003 31 63 35 2 0 0
Sep 8-10 2003 14 58 40 2 -5 -10.7143
Sep 19-21 2003 11 50 48 2 -8 -21.8182
Oct 6-8 2003 17 55 44 1 5 8.8235
Oct 24-26 2003 18 54 44 2 -1 -1.6667
Nov 3-5 2003 10 54 44 2 0 0
Nov 14-16 2003 11 56 42 2 2 5.4545
Dec 5-7 2003 21 59 39 2 3 4.2857
Dec 14 2003 9 62 33 5 3 10
Dec 15-16 2003 1 65 33 2 3 90
Jan 9-11 2004 25 59 38 3 -6 -7.2
Jan 29-Feb 1 2004 20 49 49 2 -10 -15
Mar 5-7 2004 36 55 43 2 6 5
Mar 26-28 2004 21 56 41 3 1 1.4286
Apr 5-8 2004 10 50 47 3 -6 -18
Apr 16-18 2004 11 52 46 2 2 5.4545
May 2-4 2004 16 50 47 3 -2 -3.75
May 7-9 2004 5 44 54 2 -6 -36
May 21-23 2004 14 45 52 3 1 2.1429
Jun 3-6 2004 13 46 53 2 1 2.3077
Jun 21-23 2004 18 46 51 3 0 0
Jul 8-11 2004 17 47 50 3 1 1.7647
Aug 9-11 2004 32 49 47 3 2 1.875
Aug 23-25 2004 14 50 46 3 1 2.1429
Sep 3-5 2004 11 49 48 3 -1 -2.7273
Oct 9-10 2004 36 44 54 2 -5 -4.1667
Jan 3-5 2005 86 46 52 2 2 0.6977
Feb 7-10 2005 35 48 50 2 2 1.7143
Apr 1-2 2005 53 46 53 1 -2 -1.1321
Apr 29-May 1 2005 28 41 57 2 -5 -5.3571
Jun 6-8 2005 38 41 56 2 0 0
Jul 7-10 2005 31 44 53 2 3 2.9032
Aug 5-7 2005 29 44 54 2 0 0
Sep 12-15 2005 38 45 54 1 1 0.7895
Nov 11-13 2005 60 38 60 2 -7 -3.5
Entire War 1043 -15 -0.4314
Before Abu Ghraib 469 -1 -0.064
Initial Release 16 -2 -3.75
2 May-7 May 04 5 -6 -36
7 May-21 May 04 14 1 2.1429
21 May-3 Jun 04 13 1 2.3077
After Abu Ghraib 526 -8 -0.4563  
Table 3-6. Gallup “Worth It Question” Iraq.274 
                                                 
274 CNN/USA Today/Gallup Polls, 1/3-5/2003 to 11/11-13/2006, MoE +/- 3, located at 
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IV. COMPARISON OF CASES 
 Both My Lai and Abu Ghraib are similar incidents because both illustrate the 
effect of willful acts of atrocity, occurring during times of war or conflict, perpetrated by 
a few “bad apples.”  Their actions, while not indicative of the military as a whole, did 
capture the attention of the American public as well as create concerns among decision 
makers that their occurrence would adversely affect public opinion support for the war.  
Nevertheless, careful examination of public opinion polling data, measuring generalized 
war support during the timeframes of these incidents, reveals seemingly different effects 
on public opinion support.  While My Lai appears to have had little to no measurable 
effect whatsoever, Abu Ghraib seems to have adversely affected the public’s support for 
the Iraq War, at least in the short term.  Placing the individual intricacies of My Lai and 
Abu Ghraib aside, why would these two similar incidents have differing outcomes?  
Possible explanations may be found in the lack of measurement points for My Lai, the 
fact that civilian casualty sensitivity may be greater now than it was during the Vietnam 
era, the fact that Americans seem have a heightened sensitivity to torture, the differences 
in how the perpetrators were held accountable, what the images actually showed the 
public, and, finally, the timing of when the incidents occurred during the war.    
A. LACK OF MEASUREMENT POINTS 
 Without belaboring the point, I would like to return briefly to the lack of 
measurement points for the My Lai case study.  As I suggested in Chapter III, the 
advantage of the Abu Ghraib case study is that there are three separate but similar 
generalized war-support questions, asked by two different polling organizations, offering 
us eleven different measurement points only a few weeks apart, as opposed to several 
months apart, that allow us to effectively bracket the incident.  This data helps facilitate a 
much more comprehensive and credible analysis of Abu Ghraib’s effect on public 
opinion support for the Iraq War.  Abu Ghraib is representative of almost ideal conditions 
for measuring public opinion support.  Exactly the opposite is true for My Lai.  For My 
Lai, we have only one generalized war-support question, asked by one polling 
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organization, offering us only three measurement points spaced several months apart.  
Four months elapse between measurement points one and two and three more months go 
by between measurement points two and three.  During wartime, measurement points 
spread months apart make it almost impossible to fine-tune public opinion trends.  For 
My Lai, there are simply too many variables occurring over too long a period to draw any 
firm conclusions.  As a result of these cumulative disadvantages, I was forced to coax out 
the effects of My Lai, based on the limited polling data coupled with the historical record.  
The danger here is the possibility of missing something, and in this case, missing the 
effect, because the information needed to identify the impact of the atrocity variable is 
simply not there.  Therefore, it is possible that My Lai did affect public opinion support 
in a way similar to Abu Ghraib, but the lack of measurement points precludes me from 
being able to identify the drop in support.  If My Lai followed a pattern similar to Abu 
Ghraib, then it is likely that the negative effect on war support would have been short, 
lasting only a couple of weeks after revelation of the incident on November 13, 1969.  
The recovery would have begun sometime in early December 1969 and would have been 
complete, long before our next measurement point on January 15, 1970.  As suggested in 
Chapter II, Nixon’s National Unity Campaign may have created a mini-rally during this 
period, further masking the effect of My Lai, or even shortening the duration of its effect, 
similar to what appears to have happened during the Abu Ghraib incident, following 
Bush’s “Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and Freedom” speech in late May 2004.  
Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether the My Lai atrocity really changed 
public opinion support during this timeframe.  This is particularly troublesome for our 
purposes as atrocities of this magnitude do not appear to occur that often.  While this is 
good for America, it is not necessarily good for measuring the effect of these types of 





B. CIVILIAN CASUALTY SENSITIVITY—A MORE RECENT 
PHENOMENON? 
Another possible explanation for the public’s apparent lack of response to My Lai 
is that the public’s sensitivity to civilian casualties may be a phenomenon that has 
developed more recently.  The American public may not have been nearly as sensitive to 
civilian casualties in the Vietnam era as it is in today’s conflicts.  As Larson and Savych 
pointed out in their recent study of the effects of civilian casualties on public opinion, 
America’s increasing sensitivity to civilian casualties appears to be a growing 
phenomenon.275  Interestingly, they begin their study with the 1991 Gulf War.  The Gulf 
War was the dawn of precision-guided munitions.  Americans were shown their 
military’s incredible modern capabilities on national television.  Laser-guided munitions 
were employed with sufficient precision to place them inside a small window or air 
conditioning duct in order to destroy an entire building, while minimizing collateral 
damage to other facilities located nearby.  With precision comes accuracy, and with 
accuracy comes the responsibility of fewer mistakes.  Therefore, it is possible then that 
the American public’s expectations about civilian casualties were forever changed by its 
newly-found technological precision.  This would seem to track with Gelpi and Feaver’s 
conclusions about technology’s ability to change the level of necessary combatant 
casualties that the public believes are necessary for victory in modern combat 
operations.276  Although the United States possessed some limited precision-guided 
munitions capability during the Vietnam War, accuracy was poor.  Precision-guided 
munitions were greatly improved by the Gulf War.  Thus, the military’s attempts to 
improve its post-Vietnam capability through greater precision and accuracy, and 
subsequent efforts to shed the “Vietnam Syndrome” during the Gulf War by marketing 
these newly-acquired capabilities on national television, may have had the unintentional 
consequence of forever changing the American public’s expectations of acceptable levels 
of civilian casualties.     
                                                 
275 Larson and Savych, “Misfortunes of War,” xxii.   
276 Gelpi and Mueller, “The Cost of War,” 139. 
 82
Also important is the fact that neither Larson, Savych, nor Eichenberg (the only 
scholars to directly examine the effect of civilian casualties on public opinion support for 
a war or conflict) has examined the Vietnam period.  Their work has been primarily on 
conflicts occurring post-1980.  An interesting follow-up study would be to try to 
determine if the modern trend of greater attention to civilian casualties started as a result 
of the My Lai incident and gained momentum with the dawn of precision-guided 
munitions in the Gulf War.  A related question would be whether My Lai could have 
caused military leaders, governmental elites, and the media to follow more closely 
civilian casualties because of their perceived effect on public opinion support?  Although 
civilian casualties during war or conflict appear to have been mentioned more often by 
governmental elites in official briefings and press conferences since 1985277 (Larson and 
Savych’s first data point), we are not offered any evidence as to when this phenomenon 
began.  This is potentially important as it may offer clues as to why the public responded 
differently to My Lai.  Although My Lai may not have had a measurable impact on 
public opinion support for the Vietnam War, it may have had the indirect effect of 
creating perceptions about what effect these type of incidents have on support for the war 
or conflict.  Nevertheless, what we do know for sure is that at some point in recent 
history, civilian casualties during wartime became highly “mediagenic” events.278    
C. HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY TO TORTURE 
While the beginnings of the public’s sensitivity to civilian casualties are not clear, 
we do know that Americans do not like torture or maltreatment.  In July 2004, a short two 
months following the Abu Ghraib revelations, the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA) and Knowledge Networks conducted a random survey of 892 
Americans nationwide to determine how Americans viewed the issues of detention and 
torture, especially within the context of the war on terrorism:   
Of those surveyed, the largest majority (66 percent) said ‘governments 
should never use physical torture,’ while 30 percent believed this was ‘too 
restrictive.’  Similarly, 55 percent said ‘governments should never use 
                                                 
277 Larson and Savych, “Misfortunes of War,” 206.   
278 Ibid., xx.   
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mental torture (such as making someone think that they or their family 
members will be killed),’ while 41 percent indicated that this was ‘too 
restrictive.’  Finally, 52 percent answered that ‘governments should never 
use humiliating or degrading treatment,’ with 42 percent commenting that 
this was ‘too restrictive.’279 
Similarly, PIPA questioned those polled about torture within the context of the war on 
terrorism: 
Seventy-five percent found convincing the argument that torture and abuse 
is ‘morally wrong,’ and that ‘the United States as a great nation, and as a 
moral leader in the world, should not set a bad example by engaging in 
torture or cruel or degrading treatment.’280   
PIPA then went further beyond these generalized questions to probe respondents’ 
feelings about scenarios where detainees are believed to have information that could be 
useful in fighting terrorism.  Using a high certainty of obtaining information in a high-
consequences “ticking bomb” scenario, respondents were presented with 14 different 
coercive methods.  “Of these methods, the most widely rejected was the use of sexual 
humiliation, which was approved by just 7-11 percent of the sample.”281  PIPA’s survey 
is especially useful as it was conducted a scant two months following Abu Ghraib, and 
because it reveals that a clear majority of Americans do not like torture, especially the use 
of sexual humiliation as a coercive method, even in a high-consequences scenario.  Many 
of the visual images we have of Abu Ghraib convey naked prisoners in suggestive poses 
indicative of attempts at sexual humiliation.  Recall as well that Hersh reported that a 
Special Access Program (SAP) actually encouraged the use of physical coercion and 
sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners with the intent of producing actionable 
intelligence.282  Finally, the torture at Abu Ghraib, while occurring primarily in the fall of 
2003, came to light at a particularly sensitive time following the graphic photographs of 
                                                 
279 The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, The American Public on International Issues, “Americans 
on Detention, Torture, and the War on Terrorism,” (July 22, 2004), located at 
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Terrorism/Torture_Jul04/Torture_Jul04_rpt.pdf (accessed September 
28, 2007): 5-6.   
280 Ibid., 7.  
281 Ibid., 8.   
282 Hersh, Chain of Command, 46-47 and Anonymous, “Orders to Torture,” The Nation 278, no. 22 
(June 7, 2004).   
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American contractors whose bodies were mutilated and hung from a bridge outside 
Fallujah in March 2004.283  It is reasonable to conclude the Americans expect more from 
their professional military than from the insurgents we are trying to defeat.  No wonder 
the maltreatment at Abu Ghraib created such an outcry from the American people. 
D. DIFFERENCES IN ACCOUNTABILITY 
Perhaps nowhere are the differences between My Lai and Abu Ghraib more 
apparent than in terms of accountability.  The slaughter of dozens of unarmed civilians at 
My Lai is quite different from the torture and mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.  
On the scale of immoral and unethical activity, the slaughter of hundreds of innocents 
would seemingly win out as the greater of the two evils, when compared to torture, if 
only because of its finality.  Nevertheless, neither form of atrocity is appropriate behavior 
for a professional military force, and the American public seemed to recognize that.  
Strangely though, the public responded more strongly to the maltreatment at Abu Ghraib 
than it did to the massacre at My Lai.  Some of this may be explainable by analyzing who 
was held accountable and how.  Although much of this transpired well after the initial 
effect of the incident, it is nevertheless important to our understanding of the differences 
of these two important case studies.     
Returning to the “My Lai poll” (Gallup Poll #795 12/12/1969-12/15/1969) for a 
moment, remember that 45 percent of those polled believed the soldiers should not be 
punished for their role in the massacre.  Another 27 percent indicated that they had no 
opinion on the matter.  When these two categories are combined, we find that 72 percent 
of those who had heard about My Lai either did not believe the soldiers should be 
punished, or did not feel strongly repulsed enough by the massacre to offer an opinion on 
the matter.  Furthermore, of those who indicated that the soldiers should not be punished, 
15 percent indicated “They did as they were told,” 12 percent stated, “It is war,” and 9 
percent said “They are there to do a job.”284  As I suggested in Chapter II, this response 
                                                 
283 Richard Lardner and Mike Baker, Associated Press Release, “Probe Says Contractor Provoked 
Fallujah Battle,” The Monterey County Herald, Friday, September 28, 2007. 
284 Gallup Brian, Gallup Poll #795, 
http://institution.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0795 (accessed July 15, 2007).   
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does not necessarily mean that Americans were callous, but rather that My Lai just did 
not create the widespread outrage at those responsible for the massacre that Abu Ghraib 
did.  This may be because, from the initial release of the story, most of the attention was 
focused on Calley, probably in response to media and elite cues.  Some of the American 
people reacted initially with disbelief, but others were concerned about the implications 
the news reports had for Calley’s ability to receive a fair trial.285  While the military 
seemed to recognize Calley’s culpability, the public did not.  Years later, following 
Calley’s court-martial, this put the military and the government in further conflict with 
the public.  Of course, by the time of Calley’s trial in March 1971, the public was even 
sicker of hearing about Vietnam than it was in November 1969.  Put simply, how My Lai 
was handled from the beginning apparently did not satisfy the public, who had already 
indicated as early as one month following the incident that it felt others should also be 
held accountable.286    
Abu Ghraib would spark a much different reaction from the American people.   
According to a Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll held May 7-9, 2004, 73 percent of 1,003 
Americans polled felt that under no circumstances was the abuse of prisoners justified.287  
Furthermore, 71 percent of the sample felt that the abuses were serious offenses that 
deserved criminal punishment.288  Subsequently, 65 percent blamed the soldiers who 
carried out the abuse at the prison “a great deal” for their behavior.289  Public opinion 
about Abu Ghraib seems to have been more broadly focused on the effect of the incident 
on America’s values and reputation as a country that protects civil liberties.290  Abu 
                                                 
285 E.W. Kenworthy, “Song My 1: Questions for the Conscience of a Nation,” The New York Times, 
November 30, 1969, and “Most Back Calley in a Poll for Time,” The New York Times, January 5, 1970.   
286 S. Mintz. Public Opinion Polls, My Lai. Digital History. Retrieved July 13, 2007 from 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/learning_history/vietnam/survey_q4.cfm.   
 
287 Survey by Cable News Network, USA Today and Gallup Organization, May 7-May 9, 2004.  
Retrieved September 30, 2007 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut. <http://www.ropercenter.unconn.edu/ipoll.html>   
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid.   
290 Survey by Cable News Network, USA Today and Gallup Organization, January 7-January 9, 
2005.  Retrieved September 30, 2007 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research, University of Connecticut.  <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll/html>. 
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Ghraib made the public angry because it represented disgraceful behavior by American 
soldiers, indicative of the kind of government that the United States was trying to replace 
in Iraq.  Also, as mentioned previously, Abu Ghraib did not seem to have a central figure 
like My Lai.  There were no single individuals who became scapegoats in the public’s 
eyes.  Instead, the whole barrel of “bad apples” was punished.  Punishment also seemed 
to be more standardized, with almost all of the perpetrators receiving some form of prison 
sentence.   Although far from perfect, perhaps the harsher and more timely military 
justice following Abu Ghraib better satisfied the American people.     
E. WHAT THE IMAGES SHOWED 
  Also potentially important are the images of what the American people actually 
saw at the time these incidents were revealed.  Put simply, the photographs of the scenes 
of the wrongdoings convey a different message based on what they show or fail to show 
the public.  Although Hersh and others credit the CBS Evening News interview of Paul 
Meadlo on the night of November 24, 1969 as the event that really made My Lai “big for 
America,” the Haeberle photographs, which show numerous dead Vietnamese civilians, 
had already been published by several major newspapers including The Cleveland Plain 
Dealer and The Washington Star.291  CBS had even shown several of the photographs on 
television four days prior to its interview with Meadlo.292   
Perhaps the most iconic photograph from My Lai is the famous irrigation ditch 
scene, depicting the site of Lieutenant Calley’s slaughter of numerous unarmed 
Vietnamese civilians in a drainage ditch just outside the village.  One of the most 
frequently published photographs of the massacre, it appears in almost every on-line 
search for pictures of this incident. 
                                                 
291 Hersh, My Lai-4, 152, and Belknap, The Vietnam War on Trial, 120.   
292 Belknap, The Vietnam War on Trial, 120.   
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Figure 4-1. The My Lai Massacre.293 
 
While I would not attempt to downplay the significance or horror depicted by this scene 
from My Lai, I cannot help but wonder why Americans of the 1960s responded to this 
photo in the way they did.   Hersh notes that it was this very photo that appeared on the 
front page of The Washington Star sparking outrage among its readers.294  Moreover, 
other complaints about the content of this photograph, published in major newspapers 
across the United States, described its publication as “anti-American, inappropriate, or 
even obscene.”295  Some Washington Star subscribers indicated that their offense to this 
photograph came from the fact that several of the dead victims were unclothed.296  
Strangely, this would seem to indicate that the Washington Star readers were more 
disturbed by the nudity depicted in the photographs than they were about the dead bodies.  
Perhaps this is because of the symbolic sexual humiliation that pictures of unclothed and 
dead Vietnamese lying in a ditch portrays.  (I will return to the discussion of the 
importance of sexual humiliation in the subsequent discussion of the photos of the Abu 
Ghraib incident.)  Subsequently, Hersh records that following release of the photos, a 
Time magazine poll of 1600 households revealed that “65 percent of Americans believed 
                                                 
293 Google.com. “My Lai Massacre Photos.” 
http://images.google.com/images?q=The+My+Lai+Massacre+Photos&ndsp=20&svnum=10&um=1&hl=e
n&rls=DKUS,DKUS:2006-27,DKUS:en&start=100&sa=N (accessed November 6, 2007).   
294 Hersh, My Lai-4, 152.   
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such incidents were bound to happen in any war.”297  Also potentially important is the 
fact that the photograph depicts the aftermath of the incident, failing to capture 
Americans in the process of committing the massacre.  There are no images of American 
soldiers in the photograph, which does not elicit the same emotional outcry as those that 
capture American soldiers clearly engaging in wrongdoing.    
Moreover, the photograph portrays a scene of dead Vietnamese wearing the 
standard black pajamas of those living in the region.  As a reminder, Americans were told 
by the media, their elite leaders, and those present at My Lai that U.S. soldiers were 
responsible for the massacre at the time of the photographs release.  Nevertheless, many 
Americans refused to believe that their military was capable of this kind of unjustifiable 
slaughter.298  This begs the question as to whether the American public somehow could 
accept that in the fog and friction of the difficult and dangerous counter-insurgency style 
of warfare conducted in Vietnam, in an atmosphere where the enemy was clothed in the 
same black pajamas as the civilian population, that mistakes were bound to happen?  Or 
perhaps was this the response of large numbers of Americans who were veterans of 
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, who understood that atrocities occur during wartime?   
Although a somewhat weak argument, because the photograph also portrays dead 
Vietnamese children, it could be argued that the public did not fault the military for what 
it may have perceived as a potential inability to differentiate between enemy combatants 
and civilians.  This would seem to be consistent with the military’s long-standing 
reputation as one of America’s most trusted institutions.  Put another way, perhaps the 
American public gave the military the benefit of the doubt in response to the My Lai 
photos, not because it had to, but because it wanted to.   
 The Abu Ghraib photos would provoke quite a different response from 
Americans.  Rather than responding with disbelief, anger at the press, or even 
understanding, Americans were offended and even angry about the Abu Ghraib 
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photos.299  I have included three famous photographs from Abu Ghraib, all iconic 
because of what they portray.  The first is a picture of then Corporal Charles Graner 
about to punch a bound detainee on the prison floor.  The second is a picture of Private 
Lynndie England leading a naked, leashed prisoner across the floor of the prison.   The 
third photo shows a detainee standing on top of a Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) box, with 
electrical wires attached to his fingers and genitals, while an obviously bored U.S. solider 




Figure 4-2. Abu Ghraib Graner.300 
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Figure 4-3. Abu Ghraib England.301 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Abu Ghraib Frederick.302 
 
Clearly, there can be no benefit of the doubt given to these soldiers.  There is no way 
their behavior could be misconstrued as a mistake or even accidental.  This is intentional 
and deliberate misconduct.  The soldiers are calm and relaxed, appearing to know exactly 
what they are doing.  Unlike the My Lai photo, these pictures show the soldiers in the 
actual process of mistreating their prisoners.  Also, it is clear that these are American 
soldiers who are responsible for this maltreatment.   
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I refrained from including the more graphic photographs of naked Iraqis in dog 
piles or bloody from beatings for obvious reasons.  Nevertheless, I would like to remind 
the reader that in an earlier segment of this chapter, I mentioned that the most widely 
rejected form of physical coercion in a PIPA poll was the use of sexual humiliation.  
Many of the other Abu Ghraib photos show the prisoners being subjected to various 
forms of sexual humiliation.  According to the PIPA poll, Americans do not have any 
tolerance for this type of treatment, even in the context of fighting a war on terrorism.   
Clearly, this is unacceptable behavior that could not be misconstrued as something else. 
Finally, perhaps the public’s response to these pictures reveals something about 
its understanding of the context of these incidents.  The My Lai massacre occurred on the 
battlefield, in an insecure environment, cloaked in the inevitable fog and friction of war. 
Soldiers were being shot at every day, making self-defense a much more plausible 
explanation.  However, Abu Ghraib occurred inside a maximum security prison.  While 
still a hazardous environment, it was relatively secure as compared to the lethality of the 
open battlefield.  In this type of controlled environment, the soldiers clearly had the upper 
hand.  At Abu Ghraib, the enemy had been clearly identified, searched, disarmed, and 
incarcerated.  Thus the threat to U.S. forces was much different, as was the lack of any 
possible justification for their behavior.  Undoubtedly, this was not lost on the “pretty 
prudent” public.          
F. TIMING 
The occurrence of these events within the timeline of their respective wars may 
also be of significance.  The My Lai massacre occurred fairly late in the Vietnam War, 
well after support had dropped below 50 percent and had remained there for quite some 
time.  In fact, although support for the Vietnam War began at a slightly lower rate as 
compared to the Iraq War, it held until April 1967, when support dropped consistently 
 92
below 50 percent for the remainder of the conflict.303  By the time of the September 1969 
poll, those reporting that they supported the war had dropped from 60 percent in 
September 1965 to 32 percent in September 1969, or a total of approximately 28 
percentage points.304  Support would only drop a meager 4 percent further between 
September 1969 and the last poll of the war conducted in January 1973.305  (The slightly 
positive up tick of support in May 1970 was probably a mini-rally driven by Nixon’s 
Cambodian invasion, but once concluded, the pattern of support returns to normal for the 
war.)  Similarly, comparison of the September 1969 and January 1973 polls shows that 
roughly 10 percent of the population reported that it had “no opinion” about the war.306  
This means that by the time of the My Lai massacre, most of the damage to war support 
had already been done.  Beliefs about the war had long since polarized into one of two 
camps.  The diehard supporters of the war were not going to change their opinions, and 
neither were those who vehemently opposed it.  Similarly, the small minority who 
apparently still could not make up their minds by this late in the conflict were not likely 
to be influenced much by events.  Moreover, by November 1969, the U.S. had been 
heavily involved in Vietnam for more than four years, paying significant costs in terms of 
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blood and treasure.  By the end of 1969, the U.S. had suffered 47,768 combat related 
casualties, or 82 percent of its total casualties for the entire Vietnam War.307  Similarly, 
the United States would ultimately spend $111 billion on the war in Vietnam.308  Costs of 
war by this period were even high enough to justify a national draft, with the first 
Selective Service drawing held December 1, 1969, just following release of the news of 
the massacre.309  Clearly, this late in the war, Vietnam had been “up close and personal” 
in the lives of many Americans.  Perhaps America’s sympathy towards Vietnamese 
civilians and their subsequent suffering had also diminished by late 1969.   This is not to 
suggest that America condoned the atrocity at My Lai, but rather that by this late in the 
war, concern about the bad things happening to the Vietnamese may have been 
overshadowed by America’s own heavy losses.   
It is also probable that some of America’s response to the My Lai incident can be 
explained by nothing more than simple racism towards Vietnamese and Asians in 
general.  The Vietnam War was our third consecutive war in the Asian theater.  The 
generation of Americans that fought in Vietnam was only one generation away from 
those who fought the Japanese in WWII, and less than a generation away from those who 
served in Korea.  One need not look much further than the language used to describe the 
Vietnamese during this era, including such derogatory terms as “gook,” “dink,” and 
“slope.”  Calley’s original indictment charged him with the murder of “Oriental human 
beings,” rather than Vietnamese.310  This was a time when the civil rights movement was 
still fairly new and political correctness was unheard of.  Therefore, it is likely that many 
Americans simply discounted the value of Vietnamese life and Asians in general.  Abu 
Ghraib occurred in a completely different era under a new mindset.  Today our political 
correctness and sensitivity towards racism, improper behavior, and maltreatment has 
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permeated nearly every aspect of society to include the military.  All members of the 
armed services are now required to conduct annual equal opportunity training.  This is in 
stark contrast to the era of the Vietnam War.  Put simply, things have changed.    
The Abu Ghraib incident occurred fairly early in the Iraq War at a time when 
support had not yet fallen below 50 percent.  Using the Gallup “mistake question” again 
for consistency, we find that by the time of the Abu Ghraib incident, support had fallen 
from its highpoint of 75 percent in the March 24-25, 2003 poll, to 57 percent by the April 
16-18, 2004 poll, for a total drop of 18 percent.311  When Mueller reported that support 
dropped off more rapidly during the Iraq War, his conclusions were based on the effect of 
cumulative casualties over time.312  Interestingly though, when the effect of time is 
examined separate from casualties, it appears that support for the Iraq War actually lasted 
quite a bit longer than for Vietnam.  Using the Gallup “mistake question” for consistency 
in comparison, support fell regularly below 50 percent beginning in August 2005.313  
This means that a majority of Americans supported the war for the first 29 months of the 
conflict.  Even in the worst case scenario, where the Vietnam “mistake question” is 
compared to the Gallup “worth it” question, support held the majority for almost 18 
months of war, as compared to Vietnam where support held a majority for almost 20 
months.314  Thus, even for the worst case scenario, war support lasted a comparable 
amount of time.  Therefore, the only real difference with Abu Ghraib is that the incident 
occurred early in the conflict, at a time when support was falling, but had not yet fallen 
below the 50 percent threshold.  Except for the Gallup “worth it” question, which appears 
to be a little different anyway, majority support would hold for quite some time even after 
the public became aware of the incident.  Clearly, for the Iraq War, permanent damage 
had not yet been done to public opinion support, and “war weariness” had not yet set in.  
Similarly, by the time of the Abu Ghraib incident, the U.S. had not yet paid as high a cost 
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to the Iraq War in terms of casualties.  By April 2004, the U.S. casualty numbers were at 
738, or roughly 20 percent for the entire war period as of the end of August 2007.315  
Although the exact cost numbers for April 2004 are not available, by the end of 2004 the 
Iraq War had cost the United States $77.3 billion.316  Compared in terms of casualties 
and fiscal costs, by April 2004, the Iraq War had not yet cost the U.S. nearly what the 
Vietnam War had by the time the My Lai incident occurred.  Perhaps by this period, 
Americans had not become as weary of the war in Iraq as they did in Vietnam.  Only time 
can reveal the long term effects of what the public felt and when for the Iraq War.       
G. CONCLUSION   
Explaining why these case studies had differing results is a difficult if not almost 
impossible endeavor.  For My Lai, we may never know for sure because we do not have 
the information we need to find the effect.  It would seem logical that My Lai would have 
had more of a measurable effect on public opinion support for the Vietnam War, given all 
that we know about the variables that can cause a change, albeit short-term change, in 
support for a war or conflict.  As a result, the lack of data explanation would seem to best 
explain why there was no effect for My Lai.  Most likely, there was some sort of effect, 
but either we cannot find it because we do not have enough data to bracket the incident or 
the rather weak ability of the atrocity variable to change support was somehow 
overshadowed by the presidential rally going on at the same time.  It would not be 
difficult for an average presidential rally of 3-5 percentage points to overshadow or even 
cancel out the effect of the atrocity variable of roughly the same magnitude.   
Also strong is the explanation that heightened civilian casualty sensitivity is a 
more recent, growing phenomenon.  Nevertheless, Americans were probably always 
sensitive to civilian casualties.  After all, we value human life, unlike those who seek to 
inflict mass casualties.  However, modern precision-guided munitions and almost real-
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time media reporting bring the horrors of war to the forefront of our awareness and 
discussion.  Knowledge of precision changes the public’s expectations of what is 
acceptable and unacceptable in war.  As Jesus Christ said, “From everyone who has been 
given much, much will be demanded; and from the one who has been entrusted with 
much, much more will be asked.”317   
America’s hyper-sensitivity to torture is also a salient explanation for why Abu 
Ghraib captured the public’s attention and created such an outcry.  The available polling 
data on how Americans feel about torture and especially sexual humiliation assuredly 
seems to fit the context of the Abu Ghraib incident.  Similarly, the differences in 
accountability for the “bad apples” of My Lai and Abu Ghraib are also important because 
of the resulting public’s perceptions of unfairness for the military’s handling of Calley’s 
punishment and subsequent sense of justice it seems to have felt for the Abu Ghraib 
perpetrators.  Although punishment was handed down long after the effect of the incident 
would have worn off, for My Lai, Calley was singled-out from the beginning, and from 
the beginning, the American public demanded that others be held accountable as well.   
Likewise, the images of American soldiers abusing their prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
left little doubt as to their intentions or who was responsible for the behavior.  Unlike the 
photographs of My Lai, the Abu Ghraib photos showed soldiers unfeelingly committing 
their crimes.  Finally, the four long years of costly combat in Vietnam had probably done 
more damage to public opinion support than could ever be done by any single incident, 
even of this magnitude.  Moreover, although support for the Iraq War was falling, 
Americans were still trying to make up their minds about the war when Abu Ghraib 
occurred.  Subsequently, Abu Ghraib seemed to really damage the credibility of an 
administration already reeling from the effects of not finding weapons of mass 
destruction, which it used to justify the war in Iraq.  Therefore, the individual intricacy of 
these particular incidents seems to fill the gap where the public opinion polling data falls 
short.  Unfortunately, only the occurrence of more wartime atrocities can further our 
knowledge of this difficult to understand variable affecting public opinion support.     
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 At the onset of this thesis project, I sought to determine whether acts of atrocity 
cause a negative effect on public opinion support for a war or conflict.  Additionally, I 
sought to answer three related questions: Do these acts of atrocity effectively “finish off” 
public opinion about a war or conflict, or are they merely “bumps and wiggles” in the 
public support timeline?  Can we predict the extremity of the shift in public opinion 
support following one of these incidents?  Are certain types of military misconduct more 
prone to cause a negative effect on public support?  
 Clearly, neither the My Lai massacre nor the Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal 
effectively finished off public opinion support for either conflict, as evidenced by the 
public opinion polling questions from Gallup and Pew designed to measure generalized 
war support.   Moreover, as the Abu Ghraib case study reveals, it appears that these 
incidents only have a short-term impact on public opinion support, lasting only a few 
weeks to about a month in duration.  Long-term, the data reveals that public opinion 
support quickly returns to a pattern indicative of the particular war or conflict.  Therefore, 
we can conclude that the atrocity variable is not as powerful as one would expect.  At 
best, it is a weak variable affecting public opinion support, representing nothing more 
than a “bump or wiggle” in the overall public opinion support timeline.  Following this 
same line of reasoning, the atrocity variable also appears to yield to the stronger variables 
at play, including perceptions of success or failure, casualties, time, elite influences, and 
media priming.  Also notable, is that the data fail to reveal any discernable patterns about 
where the opposition comes from.  At times, those in the undecided category more over 
to the opposition category, yielding a percentage point or two, while at other times, the 
change comes from those who had previously supported the war.  This suggests that the 
atrocity variable is more powerful at solidifying pre-existing views about a war or 
conflict, than at changing particular viewpoints.   
 Attempts to predict the extremity of shift in public opinion support caused by the 
atrocity variable are problematic.  Because the atrocity variable is a weak variable, 
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yielding a barely discernable change over a short period of time, we are at the mercy of 
the limitations of the available public opinion polling data.  As we saw with the My Lai 
case, sometimes the data fails to effectively bracket the incident, offering us a poor 
snapshot of the before and after effect.  Additionally, the My Lai data revealed that 
inconsistencies in rounding or discrepancies with the sources reporting the data can create 
confusion, and potentially lead to false results.  Similarly, all of the major polling 
organizations issue a disclaimer for their data, with a plus or minus 3 percent margin of 
error.  When looking for an effect that is already small (about 3 percent), and short-lived 
(better measured in weeks than in months), this creates a question about how much of this 
change in support is due to margin of error in the data or actual changes in support.  Also 
important is what other variables are in play at the time of the incident.  As our case 
studies showed, the president’s ability to rally the American people could completely 
overshadow the atrocity variable or help set public opinion back on course.  This suggests 
a certain amount of instability for the atrocity variable.  Unfortunately, more case studies 
are necessary to better understand the extremity of the shift caused by the variable, given 
the limitations of the available data and case studies.   
 Examination of the case studies reveals that the public reacted quite differently to 
My Lai than it did for Abu Ghraib.  Although complex, it would appear that the public 
does react differently to certain types of misconduct than it does for others.  Because I 
have already devoted an entire chapter to why I believe this to be the case, I will not draw 
any new conclusions here, but instead will re-emphasize a few key points.  Although our 
“pretty prudent” public is far from perfect, it is fair.  It did not like what it saw following 
My Lai, but it was willing to give the military the benefit of the doubt, because it 
understands that mistakes are made in the awfulness of war.  At the time, World War II 
veterans were only one generation removed from those serving in Vietnam.  Korean War 
veterans were less than a generation removed.  Perhaps the public’s sense of 
fairness/unfairness was further magnified for the My Lai case by the images it saw of 
Lieutenant William Calley.  Calley appeared very young and innocent, although today we 
know that he was not.  However, Calley’s appearance may have caused the public to 
question the fairness of the burden of warfare as placed on the shoulders of the nation’s 
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youth—specifically, the burden to carry out the policies of an administration fighting an 
unpopular war.  As such, the already “war weary” public was more willing to put the 
media, military, governmental elites, and the foreign policy on trial as opposed to the 
person.  Abu Ghraib was completely different.  The public could not give the soldiers the 
benefit of the doubt because the images it saw clearly showed maltreatment occurring.  
There was no innocence to be found in the faces of Specialist Charles Graner and Private 
Lynndie England.  There was no fog and friction of the battlefield to prompt the benefit 
of the doubt, only a semi-secure prison environment.  As such, the public demanded 
justice from the perpetrators of the injustice.  For Abu Ghraib, the public was more 
willing to put the perpetrators on trial than the media, military, governmental elites, or the 
foreign policy.   
 Finally, although based on only two data periods, the differences in the results for 
these two case studies suggest a possible trend towards an increasingly negative public 
reaction to these types of incidents.  Therefore, future acts of atrocity may resonate more 
strongly with the public than My Lai or Abu Ghraib did.  This leads to several important 
policy implications. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 While the My Lai and Abu Ghraib incidents only affected public opinion support 
in the short-term, there are several important long-term policy implications that can be 
gleaned from our analysis of these two case studies.  First, the cases revealed that the 
president emerges on top with regards to his ability to shape public opinion support for 
foreign policy.  As the My Lai and Abu Ghraib rallies illustrate, the president’s ability to 
“rally the public ‘round the flag” is an important tool can be used to minimize the effect 
of the atrocity variable or at least place public opinion back on track to a degree 
consistent with the pattern of the particular war or conflict.  Second, although acts of 
atrocity do not affect public opinion support over the long-term, they can create quite a 
distraction for policy makers, at least in the short-term.  Much of this is due to the 
“mediagenic” nature of these events.  The longer it takes to appropriately resolve one of 
these incidents, the worse off an administration will be in terms of negative press.  The 
peril here really lies in the amount of effort required to manage the bad press versus 
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concentrate on the mission at hand—specifically the war effort.  These incidents are a 
distraction from the mission and therefore should be handled as swiftly as possible, if for 
no other reason than they are a morale killer for troops serving in the theater of operations 
where they occur.  Also, as suggested in the previous section, future events may resonate 
more strongly with the public, creating an increasingly negative reaction and more severe 
consequences for decision-makers.  Third, perceptions of a cover-up, whether real or 
perceived, only make things worse, because they generate additional reporting on an 
incident, prolonging its impact.  Regardless of policy makers’ best intentions to protect 
troops serving in a particular theater of operations, once the media gets wind of one of 
these stories—it will report it, and probably sooner as opposed to later.  It would be better 
for policy makers to have a good plan to get the story out to the public, but in such a way 
where the facts are reported accurately.  This will continue to be a challenge for senior 
military leaders.  Somehow, a balance must be struck between the need for operational 
security (OPSEC), the requirement to ensure the accused receive a fair trial, and the 
necessity to protect troops serving in a particular theater versus the need to get the story 
out.  Fourth, accountability is important to the public, as is fairness, and justice.  This 
extends all the way up and down the chain of command.  Failure to maintain proper 
accountability creates the perception that only the junior officers and enlisted personnel 
bear the brunt of the punishment for incidents that clearly extend higher into the chain of 
command.  This is certainly not lost on the “pretty prudent” public, junior officers, or 
enlisted personnel.  Finally, although these acts of atrocity do not have a lasting impact 
domestically, they create a much different reaction with regards to our international 
partners.  Prudent policy makers would do well to remember that international support 
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